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ABSTRACT 
 
Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical 
Takeovers 
 
Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital 
Markets 
by 
Jaideep Shenoy 
03/25/2009 
Committee Chair: Dr. Omesh Kini 
Major Department: Finance 
 
 
 
Essay 1: An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical 
Takeovers 
We investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical integration using 
a large sample of vertical takeovers. The efficiency rationale posits that vertical integration 
prevents future holdup between non-integrated suppliers and customers. In contrast, the 
foreclosure and collusion rationales suggest that vertical integration harms competition. To 
distinguish between these hypotheses, we examine the wealth effects of the merging firms, 
acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of vertical takeovers. 
Our univariate and cross-sectional results suggest that firms alter their vertical boundaries in a 
manner that is consistent with the efficiency rationale. Our tests do not find evidence supportive 
of the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration.  
 
 
 
Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal Capital 
Markets 
 In this paper, we investigate the determinants of vertical relatedness between business segments 
of multi-segment firms and how vertical relatedness affects the internal allocation of capital. 
Consistent with theory, we observe a higher degree of vertical relatedness between segments in 
environments likely to involve contracting problems. Further, there is a greater tendency for 
investments to flow towards segments with better investment opportunities as the degree of 
vertical relatedness between business segments in the firm increases. This indicates that internal 
capital markets function better in the presence of significant vertical relatedness between 
segments. This finding supports the Stein (1997) model, which suggests that the headquarters is 
able to do a better job of “winner-picking” when firms operate in related lines of businesses. 
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An Examination of the Efficiency, Foreclosure, and Collusion Rationales for Vertical 
Takeovers 
 
1. Introduction 
The decision to vertically integrate is of fundamental importance to firms. Vertical 
integration provides common ownership over successive stages of production and facilitates 
internal exchange instead of market or contractual exchange. Since the seminal work of Coase 
(1937), the literature has developed several theories that explain what determines the vertical 
boundaries of a firm.
1
 The efficiency rationale, as studied under the Transaction Cost Economics 
and Property Rights theories, suggests that vertical integration reduces transaction costs by 
mitigating contractual inefficiencies between non-integrated suppliers and customers and 
provides incentives to make relationship-specific investments. These contractual inefficiencies 
are also referred in the literature as “holdup” (Williamson (1971, 1979), Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian (1978), Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990)).  
In addition to the efficiency argument, the extant literature proposes two distinct anti-
competitive rationales for vertical integration. The foreclosure argument suggests that a vertical 
takeover with a supplier (customer) enhances the market power of the integrated firm since it can 
deny access of the input (outlet) to its non-integrated rivals (Salinger (1988), Hart and Tirole 
(1990), and Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990)). The collusion argument suggests that a vertical 
takeover with a supplier (customer) enables better coordination between the integrated firm and 
its non-integrated acquirer rivals since the rivals need access to the input (outlet) being controlled 
by the integrated firm (Chen (2001) and Nocke and White (2007)).
2
  
In this paper, we investigate the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for 
vertical integration in a sample of 453 successful vertical takeovers over the period 1981-2004. 
                                                 
1
 Perry (1989), Joskow (2005), and Lafontaine and Slade (2007) provide extensive surveys of the literature on 
vertical integration. 
2
 In contrast, in horizontal takeovers, collusion occurs due to a reduction in the number of producers in the takeover 
industry.  
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Our paper provides the first large sample study that attempts to disentangle the above three 
rationales for vertical takeovers. To test the three hypotheses, we first examine the wealth effects 
of the acquirer and target rivals on announcement of vertical takeovers. This is consistent with 
the suggestion made in Eckbo (1983) that a test of collusion in vertical takeovers should examine 
rivals in industries of both merging partners. We build upon this approach by also investigating 
the announcement period wealth effects of corporate customers. These customers are identified 
as firms that buy the output of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. The analysis of 
customer firms enhances our ability to differentiate the efficiency hypothesis from anti-
competitive rationales and gives a more complete picture of the overall welfare effects of vertical 
takeovers. Our research design also allows us to differentiate between foreclosure and collusion 
– an issue that is potentially important from a merger policy standpoint but which the extant 
literature has not addressed.  
We distinguish between the three hypotheses by first developing and testing univariate 
predictions on the announcement period wealth effects to the merging firms, rivals, and customer 
firms, and then by investigating the cross-sectional determinants of these wealth effects. The 
reduced transaction costs (under efficiency) or the increase in market power (under foreclosure 
and collusion) both predict a positive combined wealth effect (CWE) for the merging firms in 
vertical takeovers.
3
 Under the efficiency hypothesis, the announcement period wealth effect of 
the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals is unrestricted in sign as there could be two 
opposing forces at work here. The non-integrated rivals could implement similar vertical 
acquisitions since the announcement disseminates information about possible efficiency gains 
from vertical integration (better information view). On the other hand, they could be at a 
competitive disadvantage since they might be subject to inefficiencies when compared to the 
                                                 
3
 Vertical takeovers can be backward takeovers, where the acquirer is downstream and the target is upstream in the 
supply chain, or forward takeovers, where the acquirer is upstream and the target is downstream in the supply chain.   
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vertically integrated firm (competitive advantage view). Under the efficiency hypothesis, we 
expect the customers to experience a zero or positive wealth effect based on how much of the 
benefits due to reduced transaction costs are passed on to customers through lower prices. 
Under the foreclosure hypothesis, the effect on both the non-integrated acquirer and 
target rivals is negative on account of the increased market power of the vertically integrated 
firm. Specifically, the vertically integrated firm can squeeze the margins of the non-integrated 
rivals (both upstream and downstream) by foreclosing them from input supplies or from a 
potential source of outlet. Under the collusion hypothesis, the effect on the non-integrated 
acquirer rivals is positive, whereas the effect on the non-integrated target rivals is negative. 
Specifically, the non-integrated acquirer rivals gain because of the increased coordination with 
the vertically integrated firm since the acquirer rivals need access to the input (backward 
takeovers) or a source of outlet (forward takeovers) controlled by the integrated firm. On the 
other hand, the non-integrated target rivals lose since the ensuing collusion between the non-
integrated acquirer rivals and the integrated firm leads to a reduced demand for their output 
(backward takeover) or higher input prices being charged to them (forward takeover). Finally, 
under both the foreclosure and collusion hypotheses, we expect customer firms to experience a 
negative wealth effect on account of the increased market power of the vertically integrated firm.  
To identify vertical relations between acquirer and target firms, we use the dollar value of 
commodity flows between different industries provided by the benchmark input-output accounts 
of the U.S. economy (Fan and Lang (2000), Shahrur (2005), and Fan and Goyal (2006)). These 
benchmark input-output accounts also help us identify customer industries for each vertical 
takeover. In the spirit of Fan and Goyal (2006), we calculate the vertical relatedness coefficient, 
which captures the extent of the commodity flow between the acquirer and target industries. Our 
final sample of 453 successful vertical takeovers is based on a vertical relatedness coefficient of 
- 11 - 
 
1% or greater.
4
 We find that vertical takeovers create value to the merging firms since they are 
associated, on average, with a positive CWE to the merging firms. This finding is consistent with  
the extant takeover literature (Fan and Goyal (2006)).  
For the overall sample of vertical takeovers, we find that the acquirer rivals, target rivals, 
and customers are associated with insignificant average abnormal returns. The insignificant 
returns to the rivals and customers are weakly consistent with the efficiency hypothesis. To 
further explore the hypotheses, we sub-divide our sample based on whether the takeover 
generates a positive or negative CWE to the merging firms. We expect that the efficiency, 
foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses would be more prominent in takeovers with a positive 
CWE to the merging firms.
5
  
In the sub-sample of takeovers with a positive CWE to the merging firms, we find that 
the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals are associated with positive and significant abnormal 
returns. This positive effect on acquirer and target rivals is consistent with the better information 
view of the efficiency hypothesis and inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis. The positive 
effect on the acquirer rivals is also consistent with the collusion hypothesis, but the positive 
effect on target rivals is, however, inconsistent with this hypothesis. We also find that customer 
firms that are most dependent on inputs from the downstream industry in the takeover experience 
positive and significant abnormal returns. This positive effect on dependent customer firms is 
inconsistent with the foreclosure and collusion rationales and consistent with the efficiency 
hypothesis. Summing up, our univariate results in the positive CWE sub-sample are consistent 
with the efficiency hypothesis and inconsistent with both the anti-competitive rationales. 
                                                 
4
 In robustness tests, we also use higher cutoffs for the vertical relatedness coefficient to identify vertical takeovers. 
5
 This approach is consistent with the methodology in Shahrur (2005). The analysis based on the positive-negative 
CWE split is only one piece of evidence we provide. We complement this with cross-sectional analyses which do 
not rely on this split and where we include economic variables to capture each of our hypotheses.    
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In the sub-sample of takeovers with a negative CWE to the merging firms, we expect that 
motives such as agency problems in acquirers (Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)), 
overvaluation of acquirer‟s equity due to stock financing of the takeover (Travlos (1987)), or the 
negative prospects facing the acquirer‟s industry causing it to diversify into the supplier or 
customer industry (Mitchell and Mulherin (1996)) are more dominant than the efficiency, 
foreclosure, and collusion rationales. In this sub-sample, we find that acquirer rivals and 
customer firms experience significantly negative abnormal returns, whereas target rivals 
experience insignificant abnormal returns. The negative response of the acquirer rivals could 
either be due to the takeover announcement providing new information that the acquirer industry 
faces bad prospects or due to industry-wide overvaluation conveyed by the announcement of 
stock financed takeovers. The negative response of customers indicates that value destroying 
vertical takeovers have negative spillover effects on the customer industry also.    
Next, we conduct cross-sectional analyses in an attempt to corroborate the implications of 
our univariate findings. This analysis provides cleaner tests to distinguish between the efficiency, 
foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses for the following reasons. First, we include the entire 
sample of vertical takeovers and not rely on the split based on positive-negative CWE to the 
merging firms. Second, by including economic variables related specifically to the efficiency, 
foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses we are able to account for the view that these hypotheses 
may not be mutually exclusive. We also include control variables for other motives that the 
extant literature has shown to be causing a negative CWE for the merging firms.  
First, we examine the determinants of the CWE to the merging firms. Under the 
efficiency hypothesis, firms are wary of making relationship-specific investments (RSI) because 
they foresee future holdup. If the vertical takeover was indeed motivated to solve future holdup, 
we would expect a higher intensity of RSI post-merger. Based upon this notion, we posit that the 
RSI of the integrated firm less the pre-merger asset-weighted RSI of the acquirer and target 
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captures the extent of the holdup problem. Prior studies have employed R&D intensity to 
measure RSI (Levy (1985), Allen and Phillips (2000) and Kale and Shahrur (2007)). Based on 
this literature, we use the industry-adjusted change in R&D intensity of the merging firms around 
the year of takeover announcement as a proxy for the extent of the holdup problem. We find that 
this proxy is positively related to the CWE of the merging firms suggesting that the gains from  
vertical integration are higher when the extent of the future holdup problem is severe. 
As a measure of potential foreclosure, we include the market share of the target (acquirer) 
since the higher the market share of the target (acquirer), the greater is the ability of the 
integrated firm to foreclose non-integrated acquirer (target) rivals. Similarly, we use the acquirer 
industry concentration as a measure for potential collusion, since the higher the concentration in 
acquirer industry, the higher is the likelihood of the integrated firm colluding with the non-
integrated acquirer rivals. Inconsistent with the anticompetitive rationales, we find that the 
acquirer/target market share and acquirer industry concentration do not affect the CWE to the 
merging firms.  
We next examine the determinants of the wealth effects of the acquirer rivals, target 
rivals, and customer firms. We find that the CWE of the merging firms is positively related to the 
wealth effect of the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals. This is inconsistent with the 
foreclosure hypothesis, where we expect a negative relation between the returns to the merging 
firms and rivals. In addition, the CWE of the merging firms is positively related to the wealth 
effect of the customer firms. This goes against the foreclosure and collusion hypotheses, where 
we expect a negative relation between returns to the merging firms and customer firms. Further, 
we find that acquirer industry concentration does not affect the wealth effect of the non-
integrated rivals and customer firms. This is inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis. Finally, 
the acquirer and target market share affect the customer returns in a manner that contradicts the 
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predictions of foreclosure hypothesis. Overall, our cross-sectional analyses provide additional 
evidence supporting the efficiency hypothesis. 
Our study contributes to the extant literature in the following ways. First, we provide the 
first comprehensive and large sample study that attempts to disentangle the efficiency, 
foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical takeovers. Second, our univariate and cross-
sectional findings indicate that vertical takeovers are motivated by efficiency improvement rather 
than anti-competitive rationales. Our findings build upon the work in Eckbo (1983) and 
Rosengren and Meehan (1994) which does not find evidence supporting anti-competitive effects 
in vertical takeovers challenged by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of 
Justice (DOJ) prior to 1978. Our evidence also advances the industry-specific case studies which 
find that vertical integration is efficiency enhancing (Mullin and Mullin (1997), Chipty (2001), 
and Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007)). Third, in the 1990‟s the FTC and DOJ have shown 
substantial interest in vertical takeovers on the grounds of foreclosure or collusion motives 
leading to several challenges (Morse (1998) and Warren-Boulton (2002)). In this regard, our 
analysis of rivals and, in particular, the customer firms may be of interest to the regulators since 
it provides information on the welfare effects of a large sample of vertical takeovers. Finally, our 
paper complements similar studies that investigate the sources of gains in horizontal takeovers 
(Eckbo (1983, 1990, 1992), Fee and Thomas (2004), and Shahrur (2005)).  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the literature 
and develop our univariate predictions. In Section 3, we describe our data and empirical 
methodology for univariate predictions and also present the univariate results. In Section 4, we 
present our cross-sectional predictions and results. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5. 
2. Univariate Predictions 
Vertical takeovers can be of two main types: (i) backward takeovers, where the acquirer 
is downstream and the target is upstream in the supply chain, and (ii) forward takeovers, where 
- 15 - 
 
the acquirer is upstream and the target is downstream in the supply chain. Corporate customers 
are identified as firms that buy the output of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover 
(see Figure 1 for a schematic diagram). We disentangle the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion 
rationales by first developing univariate predictions on the signs of the abnormal returns to the 
merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and corporate customers on announcement of 
vertical takeovers. Our predictions are identical for both forward and backward takeovers. A  
summary of our univariate predictions is presented in Table I. 
2.1. Efficiency hypothesis 
The Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and Property Rights (PR) theories argue that 
vertical integration reduces transaction costs that arise due to contractual inefficiencies between 
customers and suppliers (Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979), 
Grossman and Hart (1986), and Hart and Moore (1990)). These theories posit that contracts are 
incomplete and hence lead to situations where the contracting parties may take advantage of the 
ambiguities in contracts and behave opportunistically in their own interests.
6
 Such opportunistic 
behavior is termed as “holdup” and leads to sub-optimal relationship-specific investments (RSI). 
Vertical integration provides common ownership, prevents future holdup behavior, and provides 
flexibility to make RSI. Using the above arguments, we expect the merging firms in vertical 
takeovers to experience a positive wealth effect since they improve productive efficiency by 
undertaking optimal RSI.  
Based on the extant literature, we use the better information and competitive advantage 
views to explain the wealth effects of the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals (Eckbo (1983, 
1990) and Rosengren and Meehan (1994)). Under the better information view, the vertical 
takeover disseminates valuable information about possible efficiency gains from vertical 
                                                 
6
 Whinston (2003) argues that the predictions of PR theory are different from those of TCE theory. Tests to 
differentiate between the TCE and PR theories are beyond the scope of this paper.   
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integration. The non-integrated acquirer and target rivals can also improve their efficiency by 
undertaking vertical integration, and therefore experience a positive announcement period wealth 
effect. In contrast, under the competitive advantage view, the non-integrated acquirer and target 
rivals are at a competitive disadvantage compared to the integrated firm since they are still 
subject to inefficiencies, and therefore experience a negative wealth effect. Overall, due to the 
opposing effects of the above two views, we expect the sign of the announcement period wealth 
effect of the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals to be unrestricted.  
The wealth effect of the customer firms enhances our ability to separate the efficiency 
hypothesis from the anti-competitive rationales. In each vertical takeover, we identify customers 
as firms that buy the product of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. If vertical 
integration reduces transaction costs, then it is likely that at least some of these benefits would be 
passed on to the customers through lower prices.
7
 We therefore expect the customer firms to 
experience a zero to positive wealth effect based on how much benefits are passed on by the 
integrated firm.  
 In prior research, Spiller (1985) investigates if asset specificity can explain gains to 
merging firms in vertical mergers. Spiller argues that the smaller the distance between plants of 
acquirer and target firms the larger would be the extent of asset specificity. He uses a sample of 
32 vertical mergers challenged by FTC prior to 1978 and finds that the gains to the merging 
firms are larger when the distance between plants is smaller. This is consistent with the 
predictions of the Transaction Cost Economics theory. He does not investigate foreclosure and 
collusion rationales for vertical integration. 
                                                 
7
 Apart from the reduced transaction costs, the other benefits of vertical integration advanced in the literature are the 
elimination of double marginalization (Perry (1989) and Joskow (2005)), a reduction in supply uncertainty (Arrow 
(1975)), and better coordination in design (Perry (1989)).  
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In summary, under the efficiency hypothesis, the combined wealth effect (CWE) of the 
merging firms is positive, the wealth effect of the non-integrated acquirer/target rivals is 
unrestricted in sign, and that of the customer firms is zero to positive (Table I).   
2.2. Foreclosure Hypothesis 
A large body of theoretical literature (post-Chicago school) shows that vertical takeovers 
can harm competition by disadvantaging the upstream/downstream rivals (Salinger (1988), Hart 
and Tirole (1990), Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), and Rey and Tirole (2006)). Under 
foreclosure, a firm acquires an essential facility in either its supplier or customer industry and 
finds it profitable to deny access of this facility to its non-integrated rivals. This leads to a 
reduction in the margins of the rivals and increases the likelihood of their exit from the industry. 
Further, foreclosure increases the barriers to entry since a likely entrant would require segments    
in both upstream and downstream industries to compete effectively with the integrated firm.  
Foreclosure can mainly be of two types: input foreclosure and customer foreclosure. 
Input foreclosure occurs when a vertically integrated firm restricts supply of the input or raises 
costs of the input that it controls to its non-integrated downstream rivals. Customer foreclosure 
occurs when a vertically integrated firm reduces the revenues of the non-integrated upstream 
rivals by not purchasing their output (Church (2004)).  
Under the foreclosure hypothesis, we expect the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals 
to experience a negative wealth effect due to the increased market power of the vertically 
integrated firm. Specifically, in a backward takeover, the margins of the non-integrated acquirer 
rivals are reduced due to the higher price of inputs from the integrated firm and the revenues of 
the non-integrated target rivals decline since they can no longer sell their output to the integrated 
firm. Similarly, in a forward takeover, the revenues of the non-integrated acquirer rivals decline 
since they can no longer sell their output to the integrated firm and the margins of the non-
integrated target rivals are reduced due to the higher price of inputs from the integrated firm. The 
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increased barriers to entry and the unfair advantage over the non-integrated rivals enable the 
vertically integrated firm to charge higher prices to customer firms. This suggests that customer 
firms would experience a negative wealth effect.  
The 1984 non-horizontal merger guidelines of the FTC and DOJ recognize foreclosure 
effects of vertical takeovers.
8
 The U.S. antitrust regulators have scrutinized several vertical 
takeovers on account of foreclosure, for example, the 1995 takeover of Wavefront Technologies, 
a developer of graphics software, by Silicon Graphics (SGI), a manufacturer of graphics 
workstations. FTC challenged this acquisition contending that it could lead to the foreclosure of 
other workstation manufacturers by increasing the costs of obtaining graphics software from 
Wavefront. Another concern was the foreclosure of the competitors of Wavefront due to the 
increased costs in developing software for SGI workstations. FTC required that SGI maintain an 
open architecture so that independent software developers could sell their product for use on SGI 
computers (Morse (1998)).
9
 
The extant literature provides industry-specific case studies and experimental studies that 
investigate foreclosure. For example, Mullin and Mullin (1997) find that U.S. Steel‟s acquisition 
of Northern Iron Ore properties promoted RSI and resulted in lower steel prices to the customers. 
Chipty (2001) finds that customers of integrated cable operators are not worse-off when 
compared to customers of non-integrated cable operators. Hortaçsu and Syverson (2007) use 
plant-level data on cement and ready-mixed concrete producers and find a reduction in prices 
when plants became more integrated. The evidence in the above case studies is generally 
inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis. In contrast, Hastings and Gilbert (2005) find that 
mergers in the gasoline industry that increase the extent of vertical relatedness increased the 
                                                 
8
 For an overview of the guidelines refer http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm. These guidelines also 
recognize the possibility of collusion arising in vertical takeovers.  
9
 The takeover of Time Warner by AOL in 2000 was also challenged by the FTC on account of foreclosure 
(Schlossberg (2004)).  
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wholesale prices on account of increased cost to the rivals. Martin, Normann, and Snyder (2001) 
and Normann (2007) provide experimental evidence consistent with foreclosure. Finally, 
Rosengren and Meehan (1994) investigate foreclosure by studying the stock performance of 
acquirer and target rivals on announcement of 19 vertical takeovers investigated by FTC between 
1963 and 1982. They find that the rivals experience statistically insignificant abnormal returns 
around the dates of announcement and challenge, which is inconsistent with foreclosure.
10
  
Summing up, under the foreclosure hypothesis, the CWE to the merging firms is positive, 
whereas the wealth effects of the non-integrated acquirer rivals, non-integrated target rivals, and  
customer firms are negative (Table I). 
2.3. Collusion Hypothesis 
Several research studies have examined the possibility that horizontal takeovers create an 
environment conducive to collusion amongst rival producers (Eckbo (1983, 1985), Fee and 
Thomas (2004), and Shahrur (2005)). Horizontal takeovers reduce the number of producers in 
the takeover industry and therefore increase the likelihood of collusion. There is less reason to 
believe that vertical takeovers are associated with collusion since they do not alter the 
upstream/downstream industry structures. However, there has been a substantial interest by the 
FTC and DOJ regarding collusion due to vertical integration as evidenced in their non-horizontal 
merger guidelines. In 1995, the FTC challenged the proposed takeover of PCS Health Systems, a 
pharmacy benefits management company, by Eli Lilly, a drug manufacturer. Prior to the merger, 
PCS‟ formulary included products of Eli Lilly‟s rivals. The FTC required a firewall to prevent 
the passing of confidential information on the pricing structure of other drug manufacturers from 
PCS to Lilly, which may have facilitated collusion between Lilly and its rivals (Morse (1998)).
11
  
                                                 
10
 Our study is a large sample study and over a different period from Rosengren and Meehan. Besides, we provide 
tests to disentangle the hypotheses by studying the customer wealth effects and performing cross-sectional analyses. 
11
 Another example of antitrust intervention on grounds of collusion due to vertical integration is the challenge by 
DOJ of the merger between AT&T Corporation and McCaw Cellular Communications in 1994 (Morse (1998)). 
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Recent theoretical work adds further support to the view that vertical integration 
increases the likelihood of collusion (Chen (2001) and Nocke and White (2007)). Chen (2001) 
shows that backward takeovers increase the likelihood of downstream collusion. In his model, 
the upstream and downstream industries are oligopolies with two firms at each level. Both 
downstream firms bid to acquire the supplier with the lower marginal cost but only one of them 
succeeds. Chen shows that the takeover creates incentives for the unsuccessful bidder to strike a 
deal with the integrated firm for input supply. The integrated firm supplies input at a price above 
its marginal cost but now has incentive to compete less aggressively in the downstream market 
since its profits depend on the input sold to the rival. The ensuing collusion between the 
integrated firm and the downstream rivals enables them to extract rents from customer firms.  
Therefore, we posit that, in backward takeovers, the merging firms and the non-integrated 
acquirer rivals would experience a positive wealth effect since there is a higher likelihood of 
collusion after the vertical takeover. On account of this downstream collusion, the non-integrated 
target rivals now have a reduced demand for their output and would experience a negative wealth 
effect.
12
 Finally, the customer firms would experience a negative wealth effect since they face 
higher input prices on account of collusion.   
Nocke and White (2007) argue that forward takeovers increase the likelihood of upstream 
collusion. Specifically, the vertical takeover of a downstream target by an upstream acquirer 
facilitates collusion through the „outlets effect‟, where the non-integrated upstream rivals cannot 
sell to the downstream segment of the integrated firm if they defect from collusive agreements, 
or the „reactions effect‟, where the vertically integrated firm is better equipped to punish 
defections of upstream rivals by competing more aggressively in the downstream market.  
                                                 
12
 Since the acquirer initiates the acquisition it is likely that the intent is to collude at the acquirer‟s industry level. 
Our predictions for the acquirer/target rivals under the collusion hypothesis are based on the assumption that 
collusion occurs at the acquirer‟s industry level.    
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Therefore, we posit that, in forward takeovers also, the merging firms and the non-
integrated acquirer rivals experience a positive wealth effect. On account of the upstream 
collusion, the non-integrated target rivals experience a negative wealth effect since they receive 
inputs at a higher price. The customer firms, who are buyers of the product of the downstream 
industry in the vertical takeover, also experience a negative wealth effect if some of the harmful 
effects of collusion experienced by the non-integrated target rivals are passed on to the next level 
in the supply chain.  
There is very little empirical evidence regarding the collusion rationale of vertical 
takeovers. Eckbo (1983), who primarily investigates collusion in challenged horizontal 
takeovers, also investigates the stock price response of the target rivals in challenged vertical 
takeovers. He finds that target rivals experience largely insignificant abnormal returns both at the 
announcement of proposal and the antitrust complaint. Consistent with the suggestion in Eckbo 
(1983), we study rivals in the industries of both merging partners since the collusive effects can 
be experienced at both the upstream and downstream levels. Further, our study is the first to 
examine the effect of collusion on customers in vertical takeovers. 
Summing up, under the collusion hypothesis, the CWE to the merging firms and the 
wealth effect of the non-integrated acquirer rivals is positive, whereas the wealth effect of the 
non-integrated target rivals and customer firms is negative (Table I). 
3. Sample Selection and Univariate Results 
3.1. Takeover sample 
 We use the Worldwide Mergers & Acquisitions section of the Securities Data Company 
(SDC) database between 1981 and 2004 to construct the takeover sample. We include deals 
which meet the following characteristics in our sample: (i) the deal should not be classified as a 
spin-off, repurchase, recapitalization, divestiture, leveraged buyout, or self-tender offer and (ii) 
the „form‟ of the deal should not be classified as “Acquisition of remaining interest”, 
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“Acquisition of assets” or “Buyback”. We define a contest for each target to include all bids for 
that target such that the period between two consecutive bids is less than a year. Consistent with 
Kale, Kini, and Ryan (2003), successful bids are identified as those where the acquirer owned 
less than 50% of the target shares prior to deal announcement and acquired at least 15% of the 
target shares during the contest.
13
 We only include those contests where both the acquirer and 
target are U.S. public firms. We also exclude contests where the acquirer or target is a financial 
firm (four-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes between 6000 and 6999). For each 
contest, we obtain the following dates: (i) the announcement date of the first bid in the contest, 
(ii) announcement date of the first bid by the successful acquirer, and (iii) the announcement date  
of the successful bid.  
3.2. Identifying vertical takeovers 
Kahle and Walkling (1996) find that firms change their industry classifications over time 
and recommend using the historical SIC instead of the current SIC to identify the primary 
industry classification of a firm. For each successful bid in our sample, we find the historical SIC 
code (Compustat data item 324) for the acquirer and target during the year of takeover 
announcement. Since Compustat provides the historical SIC code only beginning 1987, for 
takeovers prior to 1987, we use the SIC code of the segment with the highest sales during the 
announcement year.
14
 We exclude horizontal takeovers from our sample by dropping takeovers 
where the acquirer and target have the same four-digit SIC code.   
To identify vertical relations, we use the benchmark input-output accounts for the U.S. 
economy published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis every five years. The Use Table from 
the benchmark accounts provides a matrix of commodity flows between different pairs of input-
                                                 
13
 The choice of 15% target shares was originally proposed by Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983). However, to account 
for the possibility that our sample may be picking up stake purchases rather than acquisitions, we alternatively 
define successful takeovers as those where the bidder acquires 100% of the target shares in the contest. The results 
for this sample are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
14
 For takeovers prior to 1987, if the SIC of the segment with the highest sales is missing, we use the 1987 historical 
SIC. 
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output (IO) industries. For example, for a given IO industry „i‟, we can obtain the dollar amount 
of commodity flow from IO industry „j‟ required to produce the total output of industry „i‟. We 
use the SIC-IO concordance table of Fan and Lang (2000) to map the four-digit SIC codes of the 
acquirers and targets to their six-digit IO codes. We retain takeovers where both the acquirer and 
target have same six-digit IO codes since prior research argues that significant opportunities for 
vertical integration exist within IO industries (Fan and Goyal (2006)). 
Since it is likely that input-output relations change over time, we use the 1982, 1987, 
1992, and 1997 Use tables for takeovers taking place during the periods 1981 to 1985, 1986 to 
1990, 1991 to 1997, and 1998 to 2004 respectively. The 1997 benchmark input-output accounts 
incorporate the NAICS system instead of the SIC system of industry classification. Hence, for 
takeovers during 1998 to 2004, we first map the four-digit SIC codes of acquirers and targets to 
their six-digit NAICS codes using the Bridge tables provided by the Bureau of Census.  We then 
find their respective IO industries using the NAICS-IO concordance table provided in the 1997 
benchmark input-output accounts.  
As our measure for vertical relations, we calculate the vertical relatedness coefficient 
(VRC) for each pair of acquirer-target IO codes. Our approach is in the spirit of Fan and Goyal 
(2006). For every takeover, we calculate the VRCs as follows: (i) For every dollar of the acquirer 
industry total output, find the dollar flow from the acquirer to the target industry (V1,AT) and the 
dollar flow from the target to the acquirer industry (V1,TA), and (ii) For every dollar of the target 
industry total output, find the dollar flow from the acquirer to the target industry (V2,AT) and the 
dollar flow from the target to the acquirer industry (V2,TA). Then, the vertical coefficient under 
the first approach is calculated as Max (V1,AT, V1,TA) and is called ACQVRC, whereas the VRC 
under the second approach is calculated as Max (V2,AT, V2,TA) and is called TARVRC. We classify 
a takeover as vertical if either ACQVRC or TARVRC is greater than 1%. Using both approaches 
is important since if the acquirer (target) industry output is large compared to the target 
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(acquirer) industry output, it is possible that a takeover would not meet the cutoff under the first 
(second) approach.  
Based on the above sample selection criteria, we identify 453 successful vertical 
takeovers over the period 1981-2004.
15
 Table II presents the descriptive statistics for our sample. 
About 67% of the vertical takeovers are structured as mergers and the remaining 33% as tender 
offers. About 27% of the vertical takeovers in our sample are financed with equity only, 35% are 
financed with cash only, and the remaining 38% are financed with a combination of cash and 
equity. The market capitalization of the acquirers is significantly larger than the market 
capitalization of the targets. Specifically, the mean (median) market capitalization of acquirer 
firms is $15,659 million ($2,014 million) and that of target firms is $669 million ($129 million).  
The mean value of V1,AT is 0.07, which indicates that seven cents worth of commodities 
flow from the acquirer industry to the target industry for every dollar of output produced by the 
acquirer industry. Similarly, the mean value of V1,TA is 0.08, which indicates that eight cents 
worth of commodities flow from the target industry to the acquirer industry for every dollar of 
output produced by the acquirer industry. The mean value of ACQVRC is 0.09, which indicates 
that the extent of commodity transfer between the acquirer and target industries is nine cents for 
every dollar of the acquirer industry total output. Similar numbers are obtained for V2,AT, V2,TA, 
and TARVRC, which are based on target industry total output.    
In Appendix A, we provide pairs of acquirer and target industries that display significant 
vertical relationships based on V1,AT or V1,TA. Petroleum, chemicals, food, television and radio 
broadcasting, motion pictures, and semiconductor manufacturing are some of the industries that 
display significant vertical relationships. In unreported results, we find that acquirer and target 
two-digit SIC industries such as business services (SIC=73), chemicals and allied products 
                                                 
15
 Using higher cutoffs leads to a significant decrease in our sample size. Use of a 5% cutoff gives a sample of 225 
vertical takeovers. The results for this sample are qualitatively similar to the sample based on the 1% cutoff.  
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(SIC=28), communications (SIC=48), electronic and electrical equipment (SIC=36), and 
industrial and commercial machinery (SIC=35) account for more than 50% of our takeover 
sample. We also find significant vertical takeover activity during 1996-2000, which accounts for 
roughly 36% of our sample (164 takeovers).  
Since we identify our sample based on primary SIC codes, it is important that we 
investigate how the sales of the primary segment compared to the overall sales of the acquirers 
and targets in our sample. We find that the primary segment accounted for, on average, roughly 
80% of the overall sales of acquirers and roughly 92% of the overall sales of targets. This 
indicates that the primary segment accounted for a significant proportion of sales in both 
acquirers and targets. Further, if horizontal relations exist between the acquirer and target firms 
in the secondary segments, it is possible that our results are contaminated due to the inclusion of 
takeovers with horizontal relations. To allay this concern, we use segment data of the acquirers 
and targets and find 58 vertical takeovers that display horizontal relations at the secondary 
segment level. Our results are robust to exclusion of these takeovers from our sample. 
3.3. Event Study Methodology 
We use the market model to calculate the parameter estimates of the return generating 
process of the acquirer and target. We use the daily returns for 240 trading days beginning 300 
days before the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer as the estimation period. 
Further, we require a minimum of 200 daily return observations during estimation period. We 
then calculate the cumulative abnormal returns for the acquirer and target over the windows of (-
5, +5) and (-10, +10) trading days around the period between the announcement of the first bid 
by the successful acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid in the contest. 
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Consistent with Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988), we measure the combined wealth effect 
(CWE) of the takeover as the value-weighted cumulative abnormal return to the acquirer 
(ACAR) and target (TCAR). The weights are the market capitalizations of the acquirer and target 
fifteen trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer. 
3.4. Acquirer rivals, target rivals and corporate customers 
We identify non-integrated acquirer rivals as all firms on Compustat with the same 
primary SIC code as the acquirer provided they did not have a segment in the target‟s primary 
SIC code. Similarly, we identify non-integrated target rivals as all firms on Compustat with the 
same primary SIC code as the target provided they did not have a segment in the acquirer‟s 
primary SIC code. Multi-segment firms that may have segments unrelated to the primary SIC 
codes of the merging firms may create noise in the measurement of the abnormal returns. Hence, 
as a robustness check, we construct the acquirer and target rival portfolios using single segment 
firms alone. We find qualitatively similar results under this approach. 
We identify the customer firms for each vertical takeover as follows. First, we identify 
the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. Specifically, if the takeover is backward, the 
downstream industry in the vertical takeover is the acquirer‟s input-output (IO) industry; and if 
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the takeover is forward, the downstream industry in the vertical takeover is the target‟s IO 
industry. Second, we find the industry that buys the highest proportion of the total output 
produced by the downstream industry in the vertical takeover (Main Customer Industry), and the 
industry that obtains the highest proportion of its inputs from the downstream industry in the 
vertical takeover for production of its total output (Dependent Customer Industry). Further, to 
account for low input-output relationships between the downstream industry in the vertical 
takeover and the main/dependent customer industry, we consider the main/dependent customer 
industry only if the proportion (as identified above) is at least 1%. Finally, we identify single 
segment firms on Compustat that belong to the main and dependent customer industries during 
the year of takeover announcement. We consider only single-segment firms for customer 
portfolios because each six-digit customer IO industry typically includes multiple four-digit SIC 
codes, and including multi-segment firms also would create a noisy proxy for customer returns.  
For every vertical takeover, we combine the acquirer rivals, target rivals, main and 
dependent customers into separate equally weighted portfolios to account for the 
contemporaneous cross-correlation in returns. The equally weighted portfolio approach is 
consistent with Eckbo (1983), Song and Walkling (2000), Fee and Thomas (2004), and Shahrur 
(2005). We calculate the abnormal returns to the acquirer rival, target rival, main customer, and 
dependent customer portfolios for windows of (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) trading 
days around the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer. 
3.5. Wealth effects of the merging firms, rivals, and customers   
For the overall sample of 453 vertical takeovers, we find that the average acquirer 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) is -1.11% and the average target CAR is 28.94% when 
measured over the window of (-10, +10) trading days around the period between the 
announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful 
bid in the contest. Over the (-5, +5) window, the average acquirer CAR is -0.83% and the 
- 28 - 
 
average target CAR is 26.51%. For both the windows, the acquirer CAR is statistically 
indistinguishable from zero, whereas the target CAR is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
The average CWE to the acquirer and target firms is 2.21% and 2.13% over the (-10, +10) and (-
5, +5) windows and are both statistically significant at the 1% level. This finding is consistent 
with Fan and Goyal (2006), who also find that vertical takeovers create value for the merging 
firms.  
In Panel A of Table III, we report the announcement period abnormal returns of the 
acquirer rivals, target rivals, main customers, and dependent customers for our entire vertical 
takeover sample. Consistent with the extant literature, we use the Patell Z-score to test the 
statistical significance of abnormal returns (Eckbo (1983) and Song and Walkling (2000)). We 
apply the Mikkelson and Partch (1988) correction to adjust for serial dependence. We perform a 
generalized sign test for the statistical significance of the percentage of portfolios with positive 
CARs. For the overall sample, we find that the average announcement period abnormal returns to 
the acquirer rivals, target rivals, main customers, and dependent customers are statistically 
insignificant for most of the windows. The insignificant performance of the acquirer/target rivals 
is weakly consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, where we expected an unrestricted wealth 
effect. Similarly, the insignificant performance of the customer firms indicates that none of the 
efficiency gains due to vertical integration are passed on to the customers.  
The efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses, all suggest that the takeover 
created value for the acquirer and target firm. Hence, to improve the power of our tests, we sub-
divide our sample based on whether the takeover generates a positive or negative CWE to the 
merging firms. We expect the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales to be more 
prominent in the positive sub-sample. 
We find that about 51% of the takeovers have a positive CWE for the merging firms over 
the (-10, +10) window. For the positive CWE sub-sample, which is reported in Panel B of Table 
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III, we find that the acquirer rivals experience, on average, a positive and significant abnormal 
return at least at the 5% level in all four windows. For example, the average abnormal return of 
acquirer rivals over the (-10, +10) window is 1.20% and is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. The proportion of positive CARs is statistically significant at the 10% level only over the 
(-10, +10) window. However, the z-statistic for the difference in means and the difference in 
proportions between the positive and negative sub-samples is statistically significant for all 
windows. The generally positive average stock price response of the acquirer rivals is 
inconsistent with competitive advantage or foreclosure hypotheses but is consistent with better 
information or collusion hypotheses.  
Further, we find that target rivals experience, on average, a positive and significant 
abnormal return at least at the 5% level in three of the four windows examined. For example, the 
average abnormal return to target rivals over the (-10, +10) window is 0.86% and is significant at 
the 5% level. The proportion of portfolios with a positive CAR is statistically significant for the 
(-1, +1) and (-2, +2) windows. The z-statistic for the difference in means between the positive 
and negative sub-samples is statistically insignificant for all windows, whereas the z-statistic for 
the difference in proportions is significant for two of the four windows. The weakly positive 
average response for the target rivals is in the direction predicted by the better information 
hypothesis, and is inconsistent with the competitive advantage, foreclosure, or collusion 
hypotheses.
16
  
In the positive CWE sub-sample, we also find that the main customer firms experience, 
on average, a positive and significant abnormal return of 0.93% over the (-10, +10) window. The 
abnormal returns over the other three windows are, however, insignificant. The proportion of 
main customer portfolios with positive CARs is found to be insignificant over all event windows. 
                                                 
16
 The positive response to target rivals is also consistent with the acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and 
Walkling (2000) which suggests that unexpected acquisition attempts increase the likelihood of target rivals being 
targets in future acquisitions. We control for this possibility in our cross-sectional analyses. 
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However, the z-statistic for the difference in means and the difference in proportions between the 
positive and negative sub-samples is statistically significant for at least one window examined. 
While the evidence that the abnormal returns to main customers are positive can be characterized 
as weak, the picture that clearly emerges is that the main customers do not appear to be harmed 
as a result of foreclosure or collusion. Additionally, this evidence in conjunction with the 
positive abnormal returns to the acquirer rivals and target rivals is consistent with the presence of 
efficiency gains with the caveat that only a small part, if at all, of these efficiency gains are being 
passed down to the main customers. 
We expect the efficiency and anti-competitive effects of vertical takeovers to be more 
pronounced for dependent customers rather than main customers since these are firms that 
depend most on inputs supplied by the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. Consistent 
with this expectation, we find that the dependent customer firms experience, on average, a 
positive and significant abnormal return over all four event windows. For example, the average 
abnormal return for dependent customers over the (-10, +10) window is 2.98% and significant at 
the 1% level. Further, the proportion of portfolios with positive CARs is statistically significant 
for the (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) windows. The z-statistic for the difference in means and the 
difference in proportions between the positive and negative sub-samples is statistically 
significant for at least three of the four event windows. The positive abnormal returns of 
dependent customers support the efficiency hypothesis and complement our results of the 
acquirer and target rivals in rejecting foreclosure and collusion hypotheses. 
In Panel C of Table III, we report the results of the sub-sample where the merging firms 
experience a negative CWE. While it is possible that the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion 
rationales are valid in this sub-sample also, the negative CWE to the merging firm suggests that 
there could be other more dominating motives.  First, these takeovers could be driven by agency 
problems prevalent in acquirer firms (Jensen (1986) and Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990)). 
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Second, these takeovers may be stock financed and, hence, could indicate overvaluation of the 
acquirer‟s equity (Travlos (1987)). Finally, the acquirer expands into the supplier or customer 
industry because its own industry faces negative prospects and the announcements of such 
takeovers is perceived as new bad news regarding the acquirer firms and its industry (Mitchell 
and Mulherin (1996)).  
For the sub-sample with a negative CWE to the merging firms, we find that acquirer 
rivals experience negative and significant abnormal returns over all event windows. The negative 
response could indicate that the takeover is an attempt by the acquirer to expand into its supplier 
or customer industry due to the bad prospects facing its own industry, and thereby conveys 
negative information regarding all firms in the acquirer industry. Alternatively, if the negative 
CWE suggests overvaluation of acquirer‟s equity, then the negative response to rivals means the 
overvaluation could be industry-wide. Further, we find that the main and dependent customer 
firms experience generally negative average abnormal returns. This result indicates that value 
destroying vertical takeovers could have potentially harmful effects on firms that buy product of 
the downstream industry of the vertical takeover. Finally, we find that target rivals experience 
negative average abnormal returns but are statistically insignificant over most windows. These 
weak results are consistent with the acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and Walkling 
(2000) since the target rivals in value destroying takeovers could also be potential future targets.  
As argued above, the announcement period wealth effects of the acquirer rivals, target 
rivals, and customer firms in the positive CWE sub-sample are supportive of the efficiency 
hypothesis. An alternative explanation, however, could be that these returns are not due to the 
implied efficiency gains in the merger, but rather by a positive news regarding the industries 
involving the merging firms which lead to a upward trend in these industries.
17
 To test this 
explanation, we investigate the abnormal returns to the rivals and customers in the “pre-
                                                 
17
 We thank Chad Syverson for pointing this issue. 
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announcement” period. If the announcement period wealth effects are an artifact of a general 
trend in the industries involved in the merger, it is likely that we observe similar wealth effects in 
the “pre-announcement” period also.  
We use a “pre-announcement” period of (-40, -10) days and randomly assign this period 
into windows of 5 days each. We then compute the abnormal returns to the acquirer/target rivals 
and customer firms over each of these windows. In the sub-sample of deals with a positive CWE, 
we find that abnormal returns to acquirer rivals are insignificant for 81% of the pre-
announcement windows, abnormal returns to target rivals are insignificant for 67% of the pre-
announcement windows, abnormal returns to main customer firms are insignificant for 74% of 
the pre-announcement windows, and abnormal returns to dependent customers for 93% of the 
pre-announcement windows. Similar insignificant wealth effects are also observed for a majority 
of the “pre-announcement” windows in the sub-sample of deals with a negative CWE. The 
generally insignificant wealth effects in the pre-announcement windows further support the view 
that the observed announcement period wealth effects are not due to an industry trend but are 
indeed driven by the implied efficiency gains in the takeover.   
In summary, the above described univariate results uncover the following findings: (i) In 
the sub-sample of takeovers where the merging firms experience a positive CWE, the acquirer 
and target rivals tend to gain, main customer firms do not lose, and dependent customer firms 
gain, and (ii) In the sub-sample of takeovers where merging firms experience a negative CWE, 
the acquirer rivals lose, the main and dependent customer firms lose, whereas target rivals have 
insignificant abnormal returns. The evidence in the positive CWE sub-sample is inconsistent 
with foreclosure or collusion hypotheses, and, on balance, suggests that vertical takeovers are 
likely to be driven by efficiency gains.
18
 
                                                 
18
 We perform the following test to investigate the robustness of our univariate results. Use of the first bid by the 
successful acquirer may understate target returns since the target is in play since the announcement of the first bid in 
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3.6. Additional tests for foreclosure and collusion 
The rival/customer portfolios are based on all Compustat firms and therefore can include 
firms that operate anywhere in the United States. If the merging firms do not operate nationally, 
it is unlikely that rivals and customers that are distant from the geographic regions of the 
merging firms will register any wealth effects. As a robustness check, we repeat our tests using 
rivals and customers that are geographically “closer” to the merging firms. Specifically, we form 
acquirer (target) rival portfolios based on firms with the same headquarter state as the acquirer 
(target) and customer portfolios based on firms with the same headquarter state as either the 
acquirer or target. The wealth effects for rival/customer portfolios based on only the regional 
firms are largely similar to those based on all Compustat firms.  In the positive CWE sub-sample, 
which is of main interest, we find that the acquirer rivals and target rivals gain, main customer 
firms do not lose, and dependent customer firms gain. The results for the overall sample and 
negative CWE sub-sample are qualitatively similar to those reported in Panels A and C of Table 
III. Therefore, while using only the regional firms, our evidence is still inconsistent with the 
foreclosure and collusion rationales.   
As an additional test for the anti-competitive rationales, we identify sub-samples where 
foreclosure and collusion are more likely to occur. For this purpose, we use the non-horizontal 
merger guidelines of the U.S. antitrust authorities that are used to categorize vertical takeovers as 
anti-competitive.
19
 The guidelines state that vertical takeovers where the acquirer industry 
concentration exceeds 1,800 can be challenged on grounds of collusion or where the target 
market share exceeds 20% can be challenged on grounds of foreclosure. We expect foreclosure 
and collusion would at least appear in the sub-samples identified by the above criteria.  
                                                                                                                                                             
the contest. Therefore, we compute the target CAR for the window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the 
announcement of the first bid in the contest to the announcement of successful bid in the contest. Acquirer CAR is 
still measured for the window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of the first bid by the 
successful acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid. The wealth effects of the rivals/customers under this 
approach are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table III.  
19
 For an overview of the criteria refer http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/2614.htm 
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We identify two sub-samples to perform our tests: (i) all takeovers with a positive CWE 
to the merging firms and where the acquirer industry concentration is greater than 1,800, and (ii) 
all takeovers with a positive CWE to the merging firms and where the target market share is 
greater than 20%. We restrict our analysis to only those takeovers with a positive CWE to the 
merging firms since foreclosure and collusion hypotheses predict value creation for the merging 
firms. As before, we use the (-10, +10) event window to measure the CWE of the merging firms. 
We measure the acquirer industry concentration as the sales-based Herfindahl index, computed 
as the sum of squares of market shares of all firms on Compustat with the same four-digit 
primary SIC code as the acquirer during the year of announcement. We measure market share of 
the target based on the sales of all firms on Compustat with the same four-digit primary SIC code 
as the target during the year of announcement. 
 In unreported results, we find that the average CAR to the acquirer rivals, target rivals, 
main customers, and dependent customers is positive in both these sub-samples. Thereby, we 
provide additional evidence that is inconsistent with foreclosure and collusion.   
 
4. Cross-Sectional Predictions and Results 
In Section 3, we solely rely on our univariate predictions on the signs of abnormal returns 
to the merging firms, rivals, and customer firms. The evidence there is largely consistent with the 
efficiency hypothesis. In the cross-sectional analyses we include all vertical deals and do not rely 
on the positive-negative CWE split that was used in the univariate analysis. Further, since the 
efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses are not mutually exclusive to each other, we 
include economic variables related to each of the three hypotheses and investigate how these 
variables influence the wealth effects of the merging firms, rivals, and customers. We also 
include control variables for other motives that the extant literature has shown to be driving the 
deals with a negative CWE. Therefore, the cross-sectional analyses provide additional 
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corroborating evidence to disentangle the three rationales for vertical takeovers. In this section, 
we first investigate the determinants of the CWE to the merging firms. We then examine the 
determinants of the wealth effect of acquirer/target rivals and customer firms.  
4.1. Determinants of the combined wealth effect of the merging firms 
We propose the cross-sectional model given by Eq. (1) to examine the determinants of 
the CWE to the merging firms. In the model, CWE is the value weighted abnormal return to the 
merging firms, RDICHG is the proxy for the extent of the future holdup, MKTSHACQ is the 
acquirer‟s market share in its primary four-digit SIC industry, MKTSHTAR is the target‟s market 
share in its primary four-digit SIC industry, CONCACQ is the concentration of the acquirer 
industry, ACQCF is the acquirer cash flow, ACQCF (q<1) is the interaction between the acquirer 
cash flow and a dummy variable that equals one if acquirer‟s Tobin‟s q is less than one and zero 
otherwise, TAR (q>1) is a dummy that equals one if the target Tobin‟s q exceeds one and zero 
otherwise, FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the intensity of foreign competition in acquirer 
and target industry respectively, and CONTROLS include relative size and dummies for stock  
offers and hostile offers.  
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Under the efficiency hypothesis, firms vertically integrate when they expect potential for 
future holdup. Since the vertically integrated structure gives more flexibility than the non-
integrated structure to make relationship-specific investments (RSI), we expect an increase in the 
intensity of RSI post-merger. Further, we expect this change to be higher, the higher the extent of 
future holdup. Prior research has used the level of R&D intensity to measure RSI. For example, 
Levy (1985) uses R&D intensity as proxy for transaction-specific capital and finds a positive 
relationship between R&D intensity and vertical integration. Allen and Phillips (2000) suggest 
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that industries with high R&D intensity are more likely to create relationship-specific assets. 
Kale and Shahrur (2007) use R&D intensity as a proxy for RSI and find that firms use less debt 
in their capital structure to induce RSI by customers and suppliers. We measure R&D intensity 
of the acquirer and target as the ratio of R&D expenditure (Compustat data item 46) to total 
assets (Compustat data item 6).
20
  
The pre-merger level of RSI is calculated as the asset weighted R&D intensity of the 
acquirer and target firm and the post-merger level of RSI as the R&D intensity of the integrated 
firm. Further, since R&D intensity is a function of the industry in which firms operate, we adjust 
the raw R&D intensity by the industry median values. The pre and post industry median R&D 
intensities are calculated as the asset weighted R&D intensity of the median firm in the acquirer 
and target industry for the year in consideration. Industry-adjusted change in R&D intensity 
(RDICHG), which is our proxy for the extent of holdup, is calculated as the difference between 
the industry-adjusted post-merger level of RSI and the industry-adjusted pre-merger level of RSI. 
We posit that when the potential for holdup is higher, the higher would be the industry-adjusted 
change in R&D intensity, and also the higher would be gains from vertical integration ( 01  ). 
As measures of potential foreclosure, we include the acquirer and target market shares 
during the year of takeover announcement. Under foreclosure, the higher the market share of the 
acquirer (target), the higher is the market power to the integrated firm to foreclose the non-
integrated target (acquirer) rivals, and hence, the higher should be the gains to the merging firms 
( 02  , 03  ). Acquirer (target) market share is measured based on the sales of all firms on 
Compustat with the same four-digit primary SIC code as the acquirer (target) during the year of 
announcement. As a measure for potential collusion, we include the concentration of the acquirer 
                                                 
20
 As in Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006), Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) and Kale and Shahrur (2007), we 
replace missing observations of R&D expenditure by zero. The mean value of RDICHG for the overall sample is 
0.05%. For the sub-sample of takeovers with a positive CWE to merging firms, the mean RDICHG is 0.63%, and 
for the sub-sample of takeovers with negative CWE, the mean RDICHG is -0.58%.   
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industry. Under collusion, the higher the concentration of the acquirer industry, the higher is the 
likelihood of collusion between the integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer rivals after 
the vertical takeover and, hence, the higher should be the gains to the merging firms ( 04  ). 
Acquirer industry concentration is measured as the sales-based Herfindahl index and computed 
as the sum of squares of market shares of all firms on Compustat with the acquirer‟s four-digit 
primary SIC code during the announcement year.
21
 
In our univariate analysis, we find that a significant proportion of vertical takeovers are 
associated with a negative CWE to the merging firms. To investigate if agency problems in 
acquirers lead to the negative CWE, we include as control variables, acquirer cash flow 
(ACQCF) and an interaction between the acquirer cash flow and a dummy variable that equals 
one if acquirer‟s Tobin‟s q is less than one and zero otherwise (ACQCF (q<1)). This approach is 
consistent with Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991). Under the agency hypothesis, cash rich 
acquirers with low Tobin‟s q are more likely to engage in value-destroying acquisitions. 
Accordingly, the higher the cash flows with a low q acquirer, the greater is the extent of value 
destruction ( 06  ). Further, as in Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991), we include a dummy 
variable that equals one if the target Tobin‟s q is greater than one and zero otherwise (TAR 
(q>1)). Targets with low Tobin‟s q have poor quality of current management, and hence the 
higher would be the potential gains from a change in control ( 07  ). Consistent with their 
approach, we measure Tobin‟s q as the book value of assets plus the market value of equity less 
the book value of equity divided by the book value of assets, and cash flow as operating income 
                                                 
21
 Since the antitrust authorities use critical values of industry concentration, we use a dummy variable that is equal 
to one for takeovers where acquirer industry concentration is greater than 1,800 and zero otherwise instead of raw 
values of concentration. The results under this approach are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
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before depreciation less interest expense, taxes, preferred dividends and common dividends for 
the calendar year prior to the takeover normalized by the book value of assets.
22
          
In all our regressions, we include intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer 
(FORCOMPACQ) and target (FORCOMPTAR) industries as additional control variables since 
imports can increase the level of competition in an industry (Katics and Peterson (1994)). We 
measure the intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer (target) industry as ratio of the level 
of imports in the acquirer (target) industry to the total supply in the acquirer (target) industry. 
These measures are similar to the proxies used in Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Shahrur 
(2005). Consistent with the extant takeover literature, we use relative size (Servaes (1991), 
Mulherin and Boone (2000), and Shahrur (2005)), a dummy for stock offers (Travlos (1987)), 
and a dummy for hostile takeovers (Schwert (2000) and Shahrur (2005)) as additional control 
variables. We measure relative size as the ratio of the target market capitalization to the acquirer 
market capitalization fifteen days prior to announcement of the first bid by the successful 
acquirer.  
We report the results for the CWE regression in Table IV. We use a window of (-10, +10) 
days around the period between the announcement of first bid by the successful acquirer to the 
announcement of the successful bid in the contest to calculate CWE. We calculate the industry-
adjusted change in R&D intensity (RDICHG) for calendar year windows (-1, +2), and (-2, +2) 
years around the year of takeover announcement. Consistent with the extant takeover literature, 
we implement weighted least square (WLS) regressions where the weights are the inverse of the 
standard deviation of the market model residuals. Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) 
argue that bidder managers voluntarily engage in takeovers when they possess private 
information regarding the potential synergies of the takeover. In such cases, the cross sectional 
                                                 
22
 Tobin‟s q is measured as {DATA6 + (DATA25*DATA199) - DATA60}/DATA6, and Cash flow as {DATA13 - 
DATA15 - (DATA16 - Change in DATA35) - DATA19 - DATA21} divided by DATA6. 
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regressions based on OLS and WLS are inconsistent. To account for this endogeneity, they 
construct a consistent maximum likelihood estimator to relate announcement wealth effects to 
exogenous firm and industry characteristics. We also perform regressions using their approach.  
Consistent with the efficiency hypothesis, we find that the coefficient on industry-
adjusted change in R&D intensity (RDICHG) is positive and significant under the maximum 
likelihood (MLE) approach for both (-1, +2) and (-2, +2) calendar-year windows. We obtain 
somewhat weaker results under the weighted least square estimation (WLS) method. Inconsistent 
with the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficients on acquirer market share and target market share 
are statistically insignificant under both the WLS and MLE methods. Inconsistent with the 
collusion hypothesis, the coefficient on acquirer industry concentration is statistically 
insignificant under both the WLS and MLE methods.
23
  
We find that the coefficient on the cash flow for low q acquirers (ACQCF (q<1)) is 
negative and statistically significant except for the WLS estimation for (-1, +2) calendar-year 
window. This evidence suggests that agency problems in acquirers lead to lower takeover gains 
and is consistent with the findings in Lang, Stulz, Walkling (1991). Further, we find that low q 
targets (Target q >1) are associated with higher takeover gains under both WLS and MLE 
estimation. If low q targets have inefficient management, then this result suggests that a change  
in control through a corporate takeover creates value.  
We find that the coefficients on the intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer and 
target industry are insignificant. Consistent with the extant takeover literature, we find that 
relative size is positively related to the takeover gains, stock financed takeovers are associated 
with lower takeover gains, and hostile takeovers are associated with higher takeover gains. 
Finally, the standard error of manager‟s private information (W) is positive and significant 
                                                 
23
 Since we include both market share and industry concentration as independent variables in our regressions, a valid 
concern is if there is multicollinearity in the data. To address this concern, we compute the variance inflation factor 
for all independent variables. It is found to be less than 2 suggesting that multicollinearity is not an important factor. 
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suggesting that the model of Eckbo, Maksimovic, and Williams (1990) is well specified. In 
summary, the results from the CWE regression are consistent with the efficiency hypothesis and 
inconsistent with the foreclosure or collusion hypotheses.  
4.2. Determinants of the wealth effects of acquirer and target rivals 
We propose the cross-sectional models given by Eq. (2) and Eq. (3) to explain the cross-
sectional variation in the abnormal returns to the acquirer and target rivals respectively. In the 
models, ACQRIVCAR is the abnormal return to the non-integrated acquirer rivals, TARRIVCAR 
is the abnormal return to the non-integrated target rivals, Initial is a dummy set to one if there 
was no acquisition between the acquirer and target three-digit SIC codes during one year prior to 
the takeover announcement and set to zero otherwise, STOCK is a dummy set to one when the 
deal is stock financed and zero otherwise, HOSTILE is a dummy set to one for acquisitions 
reported as hostile by SDC and zero otherwise. All other variables are as described in Eq. (1).  
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A negative coefficient on CWE ( 1 ) is consistent with either the competitive advantage 
view of the efficiency hypothesis or the foreclosure hypothesis. Under the competitive advantage 
view, the gains to the non-integrated acquirer rivals and the merging firms are negatively related 
because the non-integrated acquirer rivals now face an efficient integrated firm. Under the 
foreclosure hypothesis, the negative relation arises because of the enhanced ability of the 
integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated acquirer rivals. To distinguish between the two 
scenarios, we examine the coefficient on the market share of the target. The higher the target‟s 
market share, the higher is the ability of the integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated 
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acquirer rivals, thereby resulting in lower gains to the non-integrated acquirer rivals. Hence, we 
expect 2 to be negative only under foreclosure.  
On the other hand, a positive coefficient on CWE ( 1 ) is consistent with either the better 
information view of efficiency hypothesis or the collusion hypothesis. Under the better 
information view, the returns to the non-integrated acquirer rivals and the merging firms are 
positively related since there is new information to the rivals regarding efficiency improvement 
through vertical integration. Under the collusion hypothesis, the positive relation arises due to 
the higher likelihood of collusion between the integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer 
rivals. To distinguish between the two explanations, we examine the coefficient on the 
concentration of the acquirer industry. Under the collusion hypothesis, the higher the 
concentration of the acquirer industry, the higher is the likelihood of collusion between the 
integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer rivals, and consequently the higher the gains to 
the acquirer rivals. Hence, we expect 3  to be positive only under collusion.  
The predictions for the target rival CAR regression are as follows. A positive coefficient 
on CWE ( 1 ) is consistent with the better information view of the efficiency hypothesis. The 
positive relation arises since the takeover announcement provides new information to the non-
integrated target rivals regarding efficiency improvement through vertical integration. A negative 
coefficient on CWE ( 1 ) is consistent with competitive advantage, foreclosure, or collusion 
hypotheses. Under the competitive advantage view, the negative relation arises because the non-
integrated target rivals now have to compete with an efficient integrated firm. Under the 
foreclosure hypothesis, the negative relation arises due to the enhanced ability of the integrated 
firm to foreclose non-integrated target rivals. Finally, under the collusion hypothesis, the 
negative relation arises due to the ensuing collusion between the integrated firm and the non-
integrated acquirer rivals.  
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The coefficient on the acquirer market share allows us to distinguish between foreclosure 
and the other two competing hypotheses. The higher the acquirer‟s market share, the higher is 
the ability of the integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated target rivals, and hence the lower 
the gains to the non-integrated target rivals. Hence, we expect 2 to be negative under 
foreclosure. To test the collusion hypothesis, we look at the coefficient on the acquirer industry 
concentration. The higher the concentration of the acquirer industry, the lower the gains to the 
non-integrated target rivals, due to higher input prices on account of upstream collusion (forward 
takeovers) or a reduced demand for their output on account of downstream collusion (backward 
takeovers). Hence, we expect 3  to be negative under collusion.  
The acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and Walkling (2000) suggests that 
unexpected acquisition attempts create a reassessment of the likelihood of acquisition attempts 
for target rivals. Under this hypothesis, the magnitude of abnormal returns to the target rivals is 
increasing in the degree of surprise in the acquisition. To test this hypothesis, we include Initial, 
which is a dummy that equals one when there is no acquisition between the acquirer and target 
three-digit SIC codes during the one year prior to the takeover announcement and equals zero 
otherwise as a control variable. Under their hypothesis, we expect the coefficient on Initial to be 
positive in the target rival CAR regression.
24
 In both the acquirer rival CAR and target rival CAR 
regressions, we include a dummy for stock offers, a dummy for hostile offers, and the intensity 
of foreign competition in the acquirer and target industries as additional control variables. If 
stock financed takeovers provide new information regarding industry-wide overvaluation in the 
acquirer‟s industry, then the returns to the acquirer rivals would also be related to the nature of 
takeover financing and we expect a negative coefficient on the stock dummy ( 07  ). 
                                                 
24
 To be consistent, we include Initial as a control variable in the acquirer rival CAR regression as well. Our results 
do not change if we exclude Initial from the acquirer rival CAR regression. 
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The regression results for the wealth effects of the non-integrated acquirer and target 
rivals are reported in Table V. We use an event window of (-10, +10) days around the 
announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer to measure acquirer/target rival CARs 
and an event window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of first bid 
by the successful acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid in the contest to measure 
the CWE of the merging firms. We winsorize the dependent variables at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 
percentile to account for outliers in the sample and perform weighted least square estimation.  
In the acquirer rival CAR regression, we find that the coefficient on CWE is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the better information view or collusion 
motives and is inconsistent with the competitive advantage or foreclosure hypotheses. The 
coefficient on the acquirer industry concentration is insignificant, which is inconsistent with the 
collusion hypothesis. Further, inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficient on 
target market share is statistically insignificant. The coefficient on Initial is insignificant 
suggesting that the magnitude of surprise does not affect the abnormal returns to the non-
integrated acquirer rivals. We also find that the coefficient on the stock dummy is statistically 
insignificant. This indicates that the performance of acquirer rivals cannot be explained by the 
industry-wide over-valuation due to equity financing. Finally, the coefficient on the hostile 
dummy is statistically insignificant suggesting that hostility in takeovers has no implications for 
rivals in the acquirer industry. 
In the target rival CAR regression, we find that the coefficient on CWE is positive and 
significant at the 1% level. This result is consistent with the better information view of efficiency 
hypothesis and inconsistent with the competitive advantage, foreclosure or collusion hypotheses. 
The coefficient on the acquirer market share is statistically insignificant, which is inconsistent 
with the foreclosure hypothesis. Further, inconsistent with the collusion hypothesis, the 
coefficient on acquirer industry concentration is statistically insignificant. Finally, the coefficient 
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on Initial is positive and significant at the 5% level which indicates that the returns to the target 
rivals are positively related to the magnitude of surprise in the vertical takeover. This result is 
consistent with the acquisition probability hypothesis of Song and Walkling (2000). The 
coefficient on the hostile dummy is negative and significant, indicating that target rivals in 
hostile acquisitions experience lower abnormal returns. The coefficients on the intensity of 
foreign competition in the acquirer and target industries are insignificant in both acquirer rival 
and target rival regressions.  
Collectively, we find that the CWE of the merging firms is positively related to the 
returns to the non-integrated acquirer and target rivals. Further, the acquirer/target market shares 
(our measures for potential foreclosure), and acquirer industry concentration (our measure for 
potential collusion) do not affect abnormal returns to the rivals. These results appear to be 
consistent with the efficiency rationale and inconsistent with the anti-competitive rationales.  
4.3. Determinants of the wealth effect of customers 
We propose the regression model specified in Eq. (4) to examine the determinants of the 
wealth effects of main and dependent customers. In the model, CUSTCAR is the abnormal return 
to the customer firms and all other variables are as described in Eq. (1). 
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Under the efficiency hypothesis, we expect that at least some of these benefits arising 
through reduced transaction costs to be passed on to customers through lower prices. Therefore, 
under efficiency, we expect the customer returns and the CWE of the merging firms to be 
positively related ( 01  ). In contrast, under foreclosure and collusion, the increased market 
power of the integrated firm enables it to extract rents from customer firms. Hence, we expect 
the customer return and the CWE of the merging firms to be negatively related ( 01  ). Under 
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the foreclosure hypothesis, the higher the market share of the acquirer (target), the higher is the 
market power of the integrated firm to foreclose the non-integrated target (acquirer) rivals, which 
in turn leads to lower gains to the customers ( 02  , 03  ). Finally, under the collusion 
hypothesis, the higher the concentration of the acquirer industry, the higher is the likelihood of 
collusion between the integrated firm and the non-integrated acquirer rivals after the vertical 
takeover. The increased likelihood of collusion leads to lower gains to the customers ( 04  ). 
As additional control variables, we include a dummy for stock offers, a dummy for hostile 
takeovers, and the intensity of foreign competition in the acquirer and target industries.     
The results for the main and dependent customer CAR regressions are reported in Table 
VI. We use an event window of (-10, +10) days around the announcement of the first bid by the 
successful acquirer to measure the main and dependent customer returns and an event window of 
(-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of first bid by the successful 
acquirer and the announcement of the successful bid in the contest to measure the CWE of the 
merging firms. We winsorize the dependent variables at the 1
st
 and the 99
th
 percentile to account 
for outliers in the sample and perform weighted least square estimation.  
Consistent with the efficiency hypothesis and inconsistent with the foreclosure and 
collusion hypotheses, we find that the coefficient on CWE is positive and significant at least at 
the 5% level in both the main and dependent customer regressions. Inconsistent with the 
collusion hypothesis, we find that the coefficient on the acquirer industry concentration is 
insignificant in both the main and dependent customer regressions. Further, going against the 
predictions of the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficient on acquirer market share is positive and 
significant in the dependent customer regression, while it is insignificant in the main customer 
regression. Similarly, inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis, the coefficient on the target 
market share is statistically insignificant in both the main and dependent customer regressions. 
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The coefficients on the intensity of foreign competition and other control variables are generally 
statistically insignificant in both the main customer and dependent customer regressions.
25
  
To summarize, we find a positive and significant relationship between the CWE of the 
merging firms and the returns to the main and dependent customers. Further, the acquirer/target 
market share (our measures for potential foreclosure), and acquirer industry concentration (our 
measure for potential collusion) affect customer returns in manner inconsistent with these 
rationales. This evidence is again supportive of the efficiency rationale and inconsistent with 
foreclosure and collusion hypotheses.  
5. Conclusions 
Vertical integration has been a topic of interest to the economists over several decades 
(Joskow (2005)). However, little is known regarding the sources of value creation in vertical 
takeovers. We attempt to bridge this gap by conducting the first comprehensive, large sample 
study that investigates the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion rationales for vertical takeovers. 
For this purpose, we identify a sample of 453 successful vertical takeovers over the period 1981-
2004 using the benchmark input-output accounts of the U.S. economy. To examine the three 
rationales for vertical takeovers, we analyze the announcement period wealth effects of the 
merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and customer firms. Our research design includes 
univariate predictions on the signs of the wealth effects to the above parties, as well as cross-
sectional analyses which include structural variables related to the efficiency, foreclosure, and 
collusion hypotheses. 
Consistent with the extant literature, we find that vertical takeovers are associated with a 
positive average combined wealth effect (CWE) for the merging firms. In the sub-sample of 
                                                 
25
 To investigate if the vertical acquisition is truly a novel transaction (first vertical merger involving acquirer/target 
industry) or just moving to the industry norm (later vertical mergers), we use the Compustat segment tapes and find 
the percentage of firms in the acquirer (target) industry that have a segment in the target (acquirer) industry, i.e. 
already vertically integrated. The mean (median) value of this variable is 2.89% (0.65%). We include this variable in 
the CWE, ACQRIVCAR, TARRIVCAR, and CUSTCAR regressions and find that it is statistically insignificant. 
The results for the other independent variables are qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper. 
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takeovers where the merging firms experience a positive CWE, we find that the acquirer rivals 
and target rivals tend to gain, main customer firms do not lose, and dependent customer firms 
gain. In our cross-sectional tests, we find that the CWE of the merging firms is positively related 
to abnormal returns to the acquirer rivals, target rivals, main customers, and dependent 
customers. Concentration of the acquirer industry (our proxy to test collusion), and market share 
of the acquirer/target firm (our proxies for foreclosure) affect to the wealth effects of the merging 
firms, target/acquirer rivals, and customer firms in a manner inconsistent with the predictions of 
these anti-competitive rationales. Finally, the industry-adjusted change in R&D intensity of the 
merging firms around the year of takeover announcement (proxy for the extent of holdup) is 
positively related to the CWE of the merging firms.  
Collectively, both our univariate and cross-sectional results indicate that firms use 
corporate takeovers to alter their vertical boundaries consistent with an efficiency improvement 
rationale rather than foreclosure or collusion rationales. Our findings build upon the work in 
Eckbo (1983) and Rosengren and Meehan (1994) which does not find evidence supporting anti-
competitive motives in vertical takeovers challenged by FTC and DOJ prior to 1978. Further, our 
evidence advances the industry-specific case studies which find that vertical integration is 
efficiency enhancing (Mullin and Mullin (1997), Chipty (2001), and Hortaçsu and Syverson 
(2007)). Finally, the non-horizontal merger guidelines of FTC and DOJ, originally set forth in 
1984, still remain in place leading to several vertical merger challenges in the 1990‟s on grounds 
of foreclosure or collusion (Morse (1998) and Warren-Boulton (2002)). In this regard, our 
analysis of the rivals and, in particular, the customer firms may be of interest to the regulators 
since it provides new information on the welfare effects of vertical takeovers in recent years.  
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Appendix A 
Pairs of Acquirer and Target Input-Output Industries and Vertical Relatedness Coefficients 
This appendix contains examples of acquirer and target input-output industries that have significant vertical relationships based on V1,TA and V1,AT. ACQIODESC 
and TARIODESC are the descriptions of the six-digit input-output industries of the Bureau of Economic Analysis. ACQIOCODE and TARIOCODE are the input-
output industry codes for acquirer and target industries as obtained from Use Table of Bureau of Economic Analysis. The 1982, 1987, 1992 and 1997 Use tables 
are used to identify vertical relations in takeovers during the periods 1981 to 1985, 1986 to 1990, 1991 to 1997, and 1998 to 2004 respectively. V1,AT (V2,AT) is the 
dollar flow from the acquirer to the target industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry total output. V1,TA (V2,TA) is the dollar flow from the target industry to the 
acquirer industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry output. Acquirer vertical relatedness coefficient (ACQVRC) is calculated as Max (V1,AT, V1,TA). Target 
vertical relatedness coefficient (TARVRC) is calculated as Max (V2,AT, V2,TA). For every acquirer-target industry pair in the appendix, the values of  V1,AT, V1,TA, V2,AT, 
and V2,TA are calculated as the average values across different Use Tables that correspond to the time period during which vertical takeovers appear in the sample.  
 
ACQIOCODE ACQIODESC TARIOCODE TARIODESC V1,AT V1,TA V2,AT V2,TA 
310101 Petroleum refining 080000 Crude petroleum and natural gas <0.01 0.67 <0.01 0.74 
680201 Natural gas transportation 310101 Petroleum refining 0.64 0.02 0.07 <0.01 
142300 Flavoring extracts and flavoring syrups 142200 Bottled and canned soft drinks 0.49 <0.01 0.18 <0.01 
160100 Broad woven fabric mills  180400 Apparel made from purchased materials 0.37 <0.01 0.18 <0.01 
190200 House furnishings 160100 Broad woven fabric mills  <0.01 0.37 <0.01 0.08 
331315 Aluminum sheet, plate, and foil mfg. 331312 Primary aluminum production <0.01 0.36 <0.01 0.35 
280100 Plastics materials and resins 270100 Industrial inorganic and organic chemicals <0.01 0.35 <0.01 0.13 
280200 Synthetic rubber 270100 Industrial inorganic and organic chemicals <0.01 0.31 <0.01 0.01 
680200 Gas production and distribution (utilities) 080000 Crude petroleum and natural gas 0.01 0.30 <0.01 0.20 
670000 Radio and TV broadcasting 760101 Motion picture services and theaters <0.01 0.25 <0.01 0.28 
3221A0 Paper and paperboard mills 322210 Paperboard container manufacturing 0.25 0.01 0.44 0.02 
760101 Motion picture services and theaters 670000 Radio and TV broadcasting 0.20 <0.01 0.23 <0.01 
311611 Animal, except poultry, slaughtering 311612 Meat processed from carcasses 0.20 <0.01 0.37 <0.01 
140101 Meat packing plants 140102 Sausages and other prepared meat products 0.20 <0.01 0.52 <0.01 
560300 Telephone and telegraph apparatus 570300 Other electronic components <0.01 0.20 <0.01 0.13 
325211 Plastics material and resin manufacturing 325190 Other basic organic chemical manufacturing <0.01 0.19 <0.01 0.15 
142300 Flavoring extracts and flavoring syrups 740000 Eating and drinking places 0.17 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
600100 Aircraft 600200 Aircraft and missile engines and engine parts <0.01 0.14 <0.01 0.35 
334119 Other computer peripheral equipment mfg. 334111 Electronic computer mfg. 0.11 0.01 0.07 <0.01 
326192 Resilient floor covering manufacturing 325211 Plastics material and resin manufacturing <0.01 0.11 <0.01 <0.01 
570300 Other electronic components 320400 Miscellaneous plastics products <0.01 0.11 <0.01 0.05 
334413 Semiconductors and related device mfg. 334111 Electronic computer manufacturing 0.11 <0.01 0.14 <0.01 
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Table I 
Summary of Univariate Predictions for the Efficiency, Foreclosure and Collusion Hypotheses  
This table summarizes the predictions under the efficiency, foreclosure, and collusion hypotheses regarding the signs of announcement period abnormal returns to the 
merging firms, acquirer rivals, target rivals, and customer firms. Acquirer rivals are firms with the same four-digit primary SIC code as the acquirer, but no segment in the 
target‟s four-digit primary SIC code. Target rivals are firms with the same four-digit primary SIC code as the target, but no segment in the acquirer‟s four-digit primary SIC 
code. Irrespective of the type of vertical takeover (forward or backward), we identify customers as firms that buy the product of the downstream industry in the vertical 
takeover.  
 
 Merging firms Non-integrated 
Acquirer rivals 
Non-Integrated  
Target Rivals 
Customers 
 
 
Efficiency hypothesis: 
     i) Better Information 
  
 
 
  ii) Competitive Advantage 
    
 
Positive 
Reduction in future holdup 
 
 
Positive 
Reduction in future holdup  
 
Positive 
Implement efficiency 
enhancing vertical takeovers 
 
Negative 
Still face holdup,  
competitive disadvantage 
 
Positive 
Implement efficiency 
enhancing vertical takeovers 
 
Negative 
Still face holdup, 
competitive disadvantage 
 
Zero to Positive   
Series of vertical acquisitions, 
lower costs passed as lower 
prices   
 
Zero to Positive   
More intense competition 
upstream 
 
Foreclosure 
 
 
Positive 
Integrated firm has an unfair 
advantage over rivals 
 
Negative 
Backward Takeover: Squeezed 
margins due to higher input 
prices from integrated firm 
Forward Takeover: Reduced 
revenues since integrated firm 
does not buy their output  
 
Negative 
Backward Takeover: Integrated 
firm does not buy the output of 
independent suppliers 
Forward Takeover: Squeezed 
margins due to higher input 
prices from integrated firm 
 
Negative 
Increased market power of the 
integrated firm 
 
Collusion between integrated firm 
and acquirer rivals 
 
 
Positive 
Higher likelihood of collusion 
enhances ability to extract 
rents from customers 
 
Positive 
Higher likelihood of collusion 
enhances ability to extract 
rents from customers 
 
Negative 
Backward Takeover: 
Downstream collusion leads to 
a reduced demand for their 
output 
Forward Takeover: Upstream 
collusion leads to higher input 
prices 
 
Negative 
Face higher prices due to 
collusion upstream 
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Table II 
Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Takeovers during 1981-2004 
  
The sample consists of 453 successful vertical takeovers during 1981 to 2004. The acquirer and target firms are 
public and the acquisition is recorded on the SDC database. Takeovers where either the acquirer or target has an 
SIC code between 6000-6999 are not considered. Tender offers and Mergers are identified based on the 
classification of the SDC database. The attitude of the deal is characterized as hostile, neutral or friendly based 
on the attitude of the first bid in the contest as reported by SDC. Method of Payment is characterized by SDC as 
all stock deals, all cash deals, and deals using both cash and stock as means of financing. Market capitalizations 
of the acquirer and target are calculated fifteen trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid date by 
the successful acquirer in the contest. Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index is the sales based Herfindahl Index of 
the four-digit SIC of the acquirer during the takeover year. Acquirer (Target) Market Share is the market share 
of the acquirer (target) in its primary industry during the year of the takeover. V1,AT (V2,AT) is the dollar flow 
from the acquirer to the target industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry total output. V1,TA (V2,TA) is the 
dollar flow from the target industry to the acquirer industry per dollar of acquirer (target) industry output. 
Acquirer vertical relatedness coefficient (ACQVRC) is calculated as Max (V1,AT, V1,TA). Target vertical 
relatedness coefficient (TARVRC) is calculated as Max (V2,AT, V2,TA). Takeovers in this sample have either 
ACQVRC or TARVRC greater than 1%. 
 
 Deal characteristics for the overall vertical takeover sample 
  
Sample 
size Characteristic Number % of sample 
Mode of Acquisition 453 
Merger 305 67.33% 
Tender Offer 148 32.67% 
   Only Stock 124 27.37% 
Method of Payment 453 Only Cash 155 34.32% 
  Stock and Cash 174 38.41% 
    Friendly 388 85.65% 
Attitude 453 Hostile 23 5.08% 
    Neutral 42 9.27% 
 
 
 Firm/Industry characteristics and vertical relatedness for the overall sample 
Firm/Industry Characteristics                                       Mean Median Max Min 
Acquirer Market Capitalization ($ mil)       15,658.89 2,014.64 276,097.00 8.26 
Target Market Capitalization ($ mil)                669.58 129.49 24,655.33 1.25 
Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index 2,127 1,484 8,683 186 
Acquirer Market Share (%) 16.68 6.46 71.78 0.10 
Target Market Share (%) 5.82 1.62 35.33 0.02 
 Vertical Relations Mean Median Max Min 
V1,AT 0.07 0.02 0.71 0.00 
V1,TA 0.08 0.03 0.66 0.00 
V2,AT 0.07 0.03 0.51 0.00 
V2,TA 0.08 0.03 0.74 0.00 
ACQVRC 0.09 0.05 0.71 0.01 
TARVRC   0.09 0.05 0.74 0.01 
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Table III 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns to Acquirer Rivals, Target Rivals and Customers 
 
 
This table provides the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) to the acquirer rival, target rival, main customer, and dependent customer 
portfolios in the vertical takeover sample based on a 1% cutoff. Acquirer CAR and Target CAR is measured around the window (-10, 
+10) days around the period running from the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the 
contest. Combined wealth effect (CWE) of a takeover is the value weighted CAR to the acquirer and target, where the weights are 
computed using the market capitalization of the acquirer fifteen trading days prior to the announcement of the first bid by the 
successful acquirer. Acquirer rival and target rival portfolios are based on all Compustat firms during the takeover year. We exclude 
firms with segments in target (acquirer) primary SIC while constructing acquirer (target) rival portfolios. The main customer industry 
is identified as the industry that accounts for the highest proportion of the total output of the downstream industry in the vertical 
takeover as long as it is greater than 1%. Dependent customer industry is identified as the industry that receives the highest proportion 
of its inputs from the downstream industry in vertical takeover to produce its total output as long as it is greater than 1%. Customer 
portfolios are based on single segment firms in Compustat. The acquirer rival portfolio, target rival portfolio, and customer portfolio 
returns are calculated as equally weighted returns for the (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), and (-10, +10) trading day windows around the 
first bid by the successful acquirer. Z statistics are used to test if the mean cumulative abnormal returns are statistically different from 
zero and are provided in the parentheses. % positive represents the proportion of portfolios that have positive returns. A generalized 
sign test is performed to test their statistical significance. Number is the number of portfolios of rivals or customers and Mean 
(Median) is the mean (median) number of firms in each rival or customer portfolio. Panel A provides the CARs for the overall sample. 
Panel B provides the CARs for the sub-sample of takeovers with a positive CWE over the (-10, +10) window, and Panel C for the 
negative CWE sub-sample over the same window. Panel D provides the z statistic for the difference between the positive and negative 
combined CAR sub-samples. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
Panel A: Abnormal returns for overall sample of vertical takeovers 
 Acquirer Rivals Target Rivals Main Customer Dependent Customer 
Number  N=438 N=445 N=382 N=374 
Mean (Median)  52 (25) 59 (28) 61 (21) 25 (8) 
Event Windows: Mean % Positive Mean % Positive Mean % Positive Mean % Positive 
(-1,+1) 0.00 49.09 0.22 54.71 0.19 50.00 0.00    45.72** 
 (0.31) (-0.94) (1.41) (1.20) (1.17) (-0.72) (0.41) (-2.06) 
(-2,+2) 0.07 49.77 0.18 52.24 0.11 49.21 0.25 52.67 
 (0.88) (-0.65) (0.81) (0.16) (0.76) (-1.03) (1.20) (0.63) 
(-5,+5) -0.37    45.43** 0.18 50.22 -0.22     46.60** 0.11 53.74 
 (-1.47) (-2.46) (0.35) (-0.69) (-0.79) (-2.05) (0.89) (1.04) 
(-10,+10) -0.10 48.17 0.19 48.65 -0.24 50.26 0.69 50.80 
 (-0.43) (-1.32) (0.48) (-1.36) (-0.94) (-0.62) (0.92) (-0.09) 
Panel B: Abnormal returns for sub-sample with positive combined wealth effect (CWE) to merging firms  
 Acquirer Rivals Target Rivals Main Customer Dependent Customer 
Number N=220 N=223 N=191 N=188 
Event Windows: Mean % Positive Mean % Positive Mean % Positive Mean % Positive 
(-1,+1)    0.25** 53.64     0.38**   56.95* 0.11 49.74     0.54** 51.60 
 (2.46) (0.81) (2.43) (1.66) (0.73) (-0.51) (2.10) (0.17) 
(-2,+2)    0.54*** 55.45     0.42**   56.05* 0.20 47.12     0.73** 55.85 
 (3.59) (1.35) (2.10) (1.69) (0.53) (-1.23) (2.56) (1.34) 
(-5,+5)     0.54** 54.09  0.54* 54.26 0.21 47.12       1.11***    59.04** 
 (2.55) (0.94) (1.74) (0.86) (0.29) (-1.23) (2.91) (2.22) 
(-10,+10)    1.20***  56.82*    0.86** 53.81  0.93* 54.97       2.98***    57.98** 
 (3.25) (1.75) (2.11) (0.72) (1.69) (0.94) (3.67) (1.97) 
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Panel C: Abnormal returns for sub-sample with negative combined wealth effect (CWE) to merging firms 
 Acquirer Rivals Target Rivals Main Customer Dependent Customer 
Number N=218 N=222 N=191 N=186 
Event Windows: Mean % Positive Mean % Positive Mean % Positive Mean % Positive 
(-1,+1)   -0.26**    44.50** 0.06 52.25 0.06 49.74 -0.53    40.32*** 
 (-2.02) (-2.14) (-0.41) (-0.04) (0.91) (-0.66) (-1.52) (-2.95) 
(-2,+2)   -0.39**    44.04** -0.06 48.65 0.02 51.83 -0.23 49.46 
 (-2.35) (-2.28) (-0.86) (-1.11) (0.53) (-0.08) (-0.85) (-0.46) 
(-5,+5)   -1.29***    36.70*** -0.17 46.40* -0.65 46.07* -0.89* 48.39 
 (-4.65) (-4.44) (-1.11) (-1.78) (-1.42) (-1.67) (-1.65) (-0.75) 
(-10,+10)   -1.42***   39.45*** -0.48     43.69*** -1.40** 45.55*   -1.63**   43.55** 
 (-3.88) (-3.63) (-1.26) (-2.59) (-2.27) (-1.82) (-2.38) (-2.07) 
Panel D: z statistic for the difference between positive and negative combined wealth effect sub-samples 
(-1,+1)  1.93*   1.92* 0.96 0.85 -0.52 0.10     2.19**  1.88* 
(-2,+2)    2.67***     2.40** 1.07 1.51 0.51 -0.82  1.85* 1.55 
(-5,+5)    3.04***       3.70*** 1.08   1.65*   1.64* 0.20    2.41**    2.28** 
(-10,+10)    3.11***       3.69*** 1.47    2.09**      2.78***   1.85*      3.68***    2.18** 
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Table IV 
Determinants of the Combined Wealth Effect to the Merging Firms 
The dependent variable is the combined wealth effect (CWE) to the merging firms for the window (-10, +10) days around the period between 
the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the contest. RDICHG is the industry-adjusted change in 
R&D intensity is measured over calendar year windows (-1, +2) and (-2, +2). MKTSHACQ and MKTSHTAR are the acquirer and target market 
shares in its primary industry during the year of the takeover. CONCACQ is the sales based Herfindahl Index of the four-digit SIC industry of the 
acquirer during the takeover year. ACQCF is the acquirer cash flow and measured as operating income before depreciation minus interest 
expense, taxes, preferred dividends, and dividends for the year prior to the takeover. ACQCF (q<1) is an interaction between acquirer cash flow 
and a dummy variable that equals one when acquirer Tobin‟s q is less than one and zero otherwise. Target q>1 is a dummy variable that equals 
one when target Tobin‟s q exceeds one and zero otherwise. FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the foreign competition in acquirer (target) 
industry and calculated as the ratio of total imports divided by total supply in the industry. Relative Size is the ratio of the market value of the 
target to the market value of the bidder measured fifteen days prior to the first bid by successful acquirer. Stock is a dummy which equals one 
when the deal is stock financed and is zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy that equals one when the deal is reported as hostile by SDC and is 
zero otherwise. MLE procedure is based on the methodology in Eckbo et al. (1990), and W represents the standard error of the manager‟s 
private information. t-statistics are provided in the parentheses.  ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.  
 
Dependent Variable: Combined wealth effect (CWE) WLS MLE WLS MLE 
Intercept       0.03***     1.06***     0.02**    1.05*** 
 (3.03) (18.38) (2.11) (17.83) 
Industry adjusted change in R&D intensity, RDICHG (years -1, +2) 0.14     0.14***   
 (1.45) (2.66)   
Industry adjusted change in R&D intensity, RDICHG (years -2, +2)     0.16*     0.16*** 
   (1.89) (3.17) 
Acquirer Market Share (MKTSHACQ) -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 0.00 
 (-1.16) (-0.70) (-0.52) (-0.19) 
Target Market Share (MKTSHTAR) 0.00 -0.03 0.00 -0.02 
 (-0.16) (-1.01) (-0.05) (-0.65) 
Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index (CONCACQ) 0.03 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 
 (1.60) (-0.84) (1.00) (-1.35) 
Acquirer Cash Flow (ACQCF) -0.03 -0.08 0.02 -0.05 
 (-0.49) (-1.60) (0.42) (-0.94) 
ACQCF (q<1) -0.30  -0.61**    -0.44**      -0.77*** 
 (-1.45) (-2.48) (-2.12) (-2.88) 
Target q >1     -0.02***     -0.19***      -0.02***    -0.19*** 
 (-2.68) (-13.41) (-2.63) (-13.07) 
Acquirer Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPACQ) 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 
 (0.85) (0.29) (0.60) (0.03) 
Target Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPTAR) 0.00 -0.04 0.01 -0.03 
 (0.09) (-0.91) (0.22) (-0.58) 
Stock Dummy (Stock)    -0.02**     -0.03***   -0.02**    -0.03*** 
 (-2.03) (-3.11) (-2.01) (-2.95) 
Hostile Dummy (Hostile)      0.06***    0.05**      0.05*** 0.05* 
 (3.63) (2.21) (2.86) (1.84) 
Relative Size      0.02***     0.02***      0.06***      0.05*** 
 (3.69) (7.61) (6.46) (4.56) 
Standard error of manager‟s private information (W) -     0.22*** -        0.22*** 
  (18.07)  (17.77) 
N 453 453 436 436 
Adjusted R-Square 0.11 n.a. 0.18 n.a. 
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Table V 
WLS Regressions for abnormal returns to Acquirer and Target Rivals 
 
The dependent variables are the abnormal return to acquirer rivals (ACQRIVCAR) and target rivals (TARRIVCAR) in 
the (-10, +10) day window around the announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer. Combined wealth 
effect (CWE) of a takeover is calculated as the value weighted abnormal return to the acquirer and target measured 
for the window (-10, +10) days around the period between the announcement of the first bid by the successful 
acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the contest. CONCACQ is the sales based Herfindahl Index of 
the four-digit SIC industry of acquirer during the takeover year. MKTSHACQ and MKTSHTAR are the acquirer and 
target market shares in its primary industry during the year of the takeover. Initial is a dummy that equals to one if 
the there is no vertical takeover between the acquirer and target three-digit SIC industries in the year prior to 
announcement and zero otherwise. FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the foreign competition in acquirer (target) 
industry and calculated as the ratio of total imports divided by total supply in the industry. Stock is a dummy which 
equals one when the deal is stock financed and is zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy that equals one when the deal is 
reported as hostile by SDC and is zero otherwise. t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
Acquirer Rival CAR 
(ACQRIVCAR) 
Target Rival CAR 
(TARRIVCAR) 
Intercept -0.005 0.001 
 (-1.02) (0.20) 
Combined wealth effect (CWE)       0.12***        0.074*** 
 (5.52) (3.13) 
Acquirer Market Share(MKTSHACQ) - 0.025 
  (1.50) 
Target Market Share (MKTSHTAR) 0.012 - 
 (0.53)  
Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index (CONCACQ) 0.024 -0.019 
 (1.21) (-1.17) 
Initial Vertical Takeover (Initial) 0.002      0.014** 
 (0.31) (2.34) 
Acquirer Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPACQ) -0.020 -0.004 
 (-0.72) (-0.17) 
Target Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPTAR) -0.005 -0.031 
 (-0.20) (-1.23) 
Stock dummy (Stock) 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.15) (-0.85) 
Hostile dummy (Hostile) -0.023     -0.028** 
 (-1.56) (-2.03) 
N 438 445 
Adjusted R-Square 0.05 0.04 
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Table VI 
 WLS Regressions for abnormal returns to Main and Dependent Customers  
 
The dependent variables are the abnormal return to main customers and the abnormal return to dependent customers 
in the (-10, +10) window around the first bid by the successful acquirer. The main customer industry is identified as 
the industry that accounts for the highest proportion of the total output of the downstream industry in the vertical 
takeover provided it is greater than 1%. The Dependent customer industry is identified as the industry that receives 
the highest proportion of its inputs from the downstream industry in vertical takeover to produce its total output, 
provided it is greater than 1%. Combined wealth effect (CWE) of a takeover is calculated as the value weighted 
abnormal return to the acquirer and target measured for the window of (-10, +10) days around the period between the 
announcement of the first bid by the successful acquirer to the announcement of the successful bid in the contest. 
CONCACQ is the sales based Herfindahl Index of the four-digit SIC industry of acquirer during the takeover year. 
MKTSHACQ and MKTSHTAR are the acquirer and target market shares in its primary industry during the year of the 
takeover.  FORCOMPACQ and FORCOMPTAR are the foreign competition in acquirer (target) industry and calculated 
as the ratio of total imports divided by total supply in the industry. Stock is a dummy which equals one when the deal 
is stock financed and is zero otherwise. Hostile is a dummy that equals one when the deal is reported as hostile by 
SDC and is zero otherwise. t-statistics are provided in the parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% respectively. 
 
 
 
Main Customer 
CAR 
Dependent Customer 
CAR 
Intercept -0.009* 0.003 
 (-1.87) (0.36) 
Combined wealth effect (CWE)       0.058**        0.145*** 
 (2.23) (4.77) 
Acquirer Market Share(MKTSHACQ) 0.021      0.042** 
 (1.29) (2.10) 
Target Market Share (MKTSHTAR) 0.007 -0.046 
 (0.38) (-1.60) 
Acquirer Industry Herfindahl Index (CONCACQ) 0.013 -0.013 
 (0.65) (-0.55) 
Acquirer Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPACQ) -0.009   -0.069* 
 (-0.32) (-1.79) 
Target Industry Foreign Competition (FORCOMPTAR) -0.009 0.006 
 (-0.35) (0.17) 
Stock dummy -0.001 0.008 
 (-0.21) (0.87) 
Hostile dummy 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.04) (-0.52) 
N 382 374 
Adjusted R-Square 0.01 0.07 
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Figure 1 
Schematic Diagrams for Backward and Forward Vertical Takeovers 
Figure 1(a) represents a backward takeover and Figure 1(b) represents a forward takeover. A backward takeover 
is one where the acquirer is downstream (customer) and the target is upstream (supplier) in the supply chain, and 
a forward takeover is one where the acquirer is upstream (supplier) and the target is downstream (customer) in 
the supply chain. To identify corporate customers for both forward and backward takeovers, we use industries 
that buy product of the downstream industry in the vertical takeover. The direction of arrows indicates the flow 
of commodities/services from a supplier to a customer. 
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Essay 2: Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries and Implications for Internal 
Capital Markets 
 
1. Introduction 
 
A large body of research argues that vertical boundaries of the firm are determined by 
the transaction costs under different organizational forms (e.g., Coase (1937), Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979), Holmstrom and Roberts (1998), 
Bolton and Scharfstein (1998)). This literature suggests that the vertically integrated form 
arises in environments where contracting costs between suppliers and customers are high. In 
this paper, we investigate two related research questions. First, we investigate the 
determinants of the vertical boundaries of firms as measured by the degree of vertical 
relatedness between business segments of the firm. Existing research examines factors that 
determine the occurrence of partial equity stakes by customers in suppliers (e.g., Fee, 
Hadlock, and Thomas (2006)) and the cross-country variation in vertical integration (e.g., 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton (2009)). We provide the first examination of industry 
characteristics that lead to vertical integration in a large sample of firms operating in the 
United States.   
Second, we investigate how vertical relatedness between business segments affects the 
working of internal capital markets. In this regard, Stein‟s (1997) „winner picking‟ hypothesis 
suggests that firms operating in related lines of businesses can do a better job in the allocation 
of corporate resources across divisions. We posit that the degree of vertical relatedness 
between business segments captures one dimension of relatedness between firm projects. We 
then investigate how our measures of vertical relatedness impact the efficiency of internal 
capital allocations. We contribute to the internal capital markets literature by investigating 
how product market relations between segments affect the efficiency of internal capital 
allocations (e.g., see Stein (2003) and Maksimovic and Phillips (2006)).     
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The extant literature on vertical integration argues that the vertical boundaries of the 
firm are determined by the nature and sources of transaction costs (e.g., Coase (1937), Klein, 
Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979) among others). In particular, when 
contracts are incomplete, the contracting parties may take advantage of the ambiguities in 
contracts and behave opportunistically in their own interests. Such opportunistic behavior 
(termed as holdup) leads to underinvestment in relationship-specific investments (RSI). 
Vertical integration, by providing common ownership, mitigates such contractual problems 
and encourages relationship-specific investments. Based on the above, our first hypothesis is 
that we should observe higher vertical relatedness between segments in environments likely to 
be characterized by contractual incompleteness and relationship-specific investments.  
Our second hypothesis pertains to the relation between inter-segment vertical 
relatedness and efficiency of internal capital markets (ICM). In particular, in Stein‟s (1997) 
model, when the corporate headquarters oversees projects in related lines of businesses, it is 
able to accurately rank projects and thereby allocate capital more efficiently. Ozbas‟ (2005) 
model extends this idea by showing that unrelated integration worsens the quality of 
information required by the headquarters to allocate corporate resources. Khanna and Tice 
(2001) provide empirical evidence that only those discount retailers who diversify into related 
businesses are able to allocate capital across segments efficiently in response to a negative 
shock.
26
 We propose that the degree of vertical relatedness between business segments 
captures one dimension of relatedness between firm projects. We then hypothesize that 
internal capital markets work more efficiently in the presence of significant vertical 
relatedness.  
                                                 
26
 They use the entry of Wal-Mart into the retailer‟s market as the measure for the negative shock.  
- 63 - 
 
Our sample comprises of 32,554 multi-segment firm-years during the period 1984-
2005 for which we obtain data on the Compustat industry-annual and segment databases. To 
identify vertically integrated firms, we calculate the degree of vertical relatedness between the 
different industries in which our sample firms have business segments. For this purpose, we 
use the benchmark input-output accounts of the U.S. economy, which provide the dollar value 
of commodity flows between different industries in the economy. We use this data to compute 
vertical relatedness coefficients between pairs of supplier-customer industries (e.g., Fan and 
Lang (2000), Shahrur (2005), and Fan and Goyal (2006) among others)). The vertical 
relatedness coefficient measures the extent of commodity transfer between these industries.  
We then weight the aggregate industry coefficients by the segment sales weights and 
arrive at two measures of firm-level vertical relatedness, (i) the segment sales weighted 
vertical relatedness coefficient between all industries in which the firm operates, and (ii) the 
segment sales weighted vertical relatedness coefficient between the primary industry of the 
firm and all its secondary industries. The extant literature uses vertical relatedness coefficients 
of either 1% or 5% to capture economically significant vertical relatedness between business 
segments within a firm (e.g., Fan and Goyal (2006) and Shenoy (2008)). Based on this 
literature, we categorize a multi-segment firm as vertically integrated if the firm-level vertical 
relatedness measure exceeds 5%.  
To test our first hypothesis, we use two industry-level measures for environments 
likely to be characterized by contractual incompleteness and relationship-specific 
investments. Allen and Phillips (2000) argue that property rights are not well defined in R&D 
intensive industries and likely to involve incomplete contracts. Kale and Shahrur (2007) 
suggest that R&D intensive industries are likely to involve relationship-specific investments. 
We, therefore, use the research and development (R&D) intensity of the primary industry of 
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the firm as our first measure. The existing research also argues that strategic alliances and 
joint ventures are hybrid organizational forms used as alternatives to vertical integration for 
solving contractual problems (e.g., Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) and Kale and Shahrur 
(2007)). Therefore, high strategic alliance/joint venture intensity between the primary industry 
and vertically related supplier/customer industries is likely to indicate environments with 
holdup problems. Accordingly, the second measure we use is the intensity of strategic 
alliances and joint ventures involving firms in the primary industry and all vertically related 
supplier/customer industries.  
We then estimate probit regressions and find a higher degree of vertical relatedness 
between segments when the primary industry of the firm is R&D intensive and when the 
strategic alliances and joint ventures involving firms in the primary industry and vertically 
related industries are more common. Both these results are supportive of our hypothesis that 
vertical integration should be observed in environments likely to have high contracting costs. 
Overall, the determinants of firm vertical boundaries seem to be consistent with theory.   
To test our second hypothesis, we use the following three metrics developed in the 
extant literature that quantify the efficiency of internal capital market (ICM) allocations: (i) 
Relative Value Added by Allocation (RVA) of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), (ii) the 
sensitivity of segment investment to q aggregated at the firm level (IQSENS) developed by 
Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and (iii) Relative Investment Ratio (RINV) of Rajan, Servaes, 
and Zingales (2000). Intuitively, these measures capture the association between segment 
investment and segment investment opportunities aggregated across all business segments of 
the firm. All three measures will have a positive value in firms that systematically allocate 
more investment toward segments with better investment opportunities.  
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We first compare the ICM efficiency measures for firms that display significant 
vertical relations to those that do not. Consistent with our expectation, firms that display 
vertical relatedness of 5% or more are associated with positive and statistically significant 
values of RVA, IQSENS, and RINV. Further, the difference in means between the vertical 
and non-vertical sample is positive and significant at conventional levels. These results 
indicate that firms with significant inter-segment vertical relations allocate capital more 
efficiently within their ICMs.  
To further corroborate this evidence, we conduct cross-sectional analyses of the 
relation between vertical relatedness and efficiency of internal capital allocations. In this 
analysis, we control for other factors that may affect the efficiency of ICMs such as the 
diversity in investment opportunities, firm Herfindahl Index based on segment sales, and firm 
size (e.g., Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000)). These cross-sectional tests provide further 
support for our hypothesis. Consistent with our second hypothesis, we find a positive 
relationship between the degree of vertical relatedness and the efficiency of ICM allocations. 
We also find that the interaction between diversity in investment opportunities and vertical 
relatedness has a negative effect on the efficiency of internal capital allocations. This result 
indicates that as the diversity in investment opportunities increases, it tends to diminish the 
beneficial effects of vertical relatedness on ICMs. The positive relation between efficiency of 
ICM allocations and vertical relatedness is robust to methodological controls for endogeneity.  
In summary, we provide evidence which indicates that vertical integration in firms 
operating in the U.S. arises in environments likely to involve high contracting costs. We also 
find that in presence of significant vertical relatedness between business segments, the 
segment investment flows towards segments with better investment opportunities consistent 
with a well-functioning internal capital market in vertically integrated firms.  
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We make the following contributions to the extant literature. First, to the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to investigate determinants of inter-segment vertical 
relatedness for multi-segment firms operating in the United States. We complement 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Mitton‟s (2009) cross-country analysis in which they find a higher 
incidence of vertical integration in countries with poor contract enforcement mechanisms and 
more financial development. We also build upon the finding in Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas 
(2006) that partial equity stakes by customers in suppliers are more likely when supplier‟s 
R&D intensity is high and if the relationship is governed through a formal contractual 
agreement such as joint venture or strategic alliance. In particular, we show that inter-segment 
vertical relatedness arises in industries likely to have incomplete contracts and relationship-
specific investments.
27
  
Second, we contribute to the ongoing debate in the literature regarding the efficiency 
of ICM allocations. One stream of papers argues that internal capital markets are detrimental 
since the corporate headquarters engages in bureaucratic decision making (e.g., Lamont 
(1997), Scharfstein (1998), Shin and Stulz (1998), Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), and 
Scharfstein and Stein (2000)). On the other hand, another stream suggests that internal capital 
market allocations are beneficial because the corporate headquarters acts as an informed 
provider of capital and directs resources towards high yield uses (e.g., Alchian (1969) and 
Williamson (1975), Gertner, Scharfstein, Stein (1994), Khanna and Tice (2001), Maksimovic 
and Phillips (2002), and Matsusaka and Nanda (2002)). We add to this literature by showing 
that vertically integrated firms exhibit a well-functioning internal capital market.
28
  
                                                 
27
 Our large sample evidence also complements prior case or industry-specific studies that examine the 
determinants of vertical integration (e.g., Boerner and Macher (2001), Joskow (2005), and Lafontaine and Slade 
(2007) provide excellent survey articles). 
28
 Yet another set of researchers argue that the evidence on inefficient cross-subsidization is an artifact of sample 
selection or measurement error in Tobin‟s q (e.g., Chevalier (2004), Whited  (2001), Colak and Whited (2007)). 
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Finally, our paper is related to the literature which investigates how the organizational 
boundaries impact the decisions undertaken by the firms‟ managers. In particular, 
Mullainathan and Scharfstein (2001) find that the capacity of vertically integrated chemical 
producers is less responsive to market conditions than the capacity of non-integrated 
producers. Guedj (2006) compares integrated projects to projects governed via contracts 
within pharmaceutical firms and finds that only upon ownership of the project does the firm 
enjoy benefits of internal capital markets.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we describe our data 
sources, sample selection, empirical methodology for computing firm-level vertical 
relatedness, and characteristics of our sample. In Section 3, we present a discussion of the 
determinants of firm vertical boundaries and the results based on probit estimations. In 
Section 4, we present a discussion of the possible relation between vertical relatedness and 
ICM efficiency measures based on the extant theoretical literature followed by our univariate 
and multivariate analysis of this relation. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 5. 
2. Data Sources, Sample Selection, Methodology for Vertical Relatedness and 
Descriptive Statistics 
2.1. Data Sources and Sample Selection 
We obtain segment data from the Compustat segment tapes and firm level financial 
information from Compustat Industrial Annual database for all active and inactive firms 
during the period 1984-2005.  For each segment, we collect data on net sales, capital 
expenditure, total assets, and SIC codes. We exclude segments that do not contain complete 
information on these variables. We also eliminate firm-years with missing firm assets or sales, 
where the sum of segment sales is not within 5% of the total firm sales, where the sum of 
segment sales is less than $20 million, and where any segment has a one-digit SIC code of six 
- 68 - 
 
(financial industry). The above sample selection criteria are largely consistent with the 
corporate diversification literature (e.g., Campa and Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004)). The 
sample based on above criteria leads us to a sample of 32,554 multi-segment and 64,045 
single segment firm-years.  
2.2. Firm Level Measures of Vertical Relatedness  
To compute measures for vertical relatedness, we rely on the benchmark input-output 
accounts of the U.S. economy. This data is published by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
every five years for the aggregate industries of the U.S. economy. Specifically, the Use Table 
from the benchmark accounts provides a matrix of commodity flows between different pairs 
of input-output (IO) industries. For example, for a given IO industry „i‟, we can obtain the 
dollar amount of commodity flow from IO industry „j‟ required to produce the total output of 
industry „i‟. A number of papers in the finance literature have used this data to measure 
vertical relations between industries (e.g., Fan and Lang (2000), Fan and Goyal (2006), 
Shahrur (2005), Acemoglu et al. (2009), and Shenoy (2008)).  
We build upon the extant literature and compute the following two measures for firm 
level vertical relatedness: (i) A measure that captures the extent of inter-segment vertical 
relatedness between all business segments of a multi-segment firm, and (ii) A measure that 
captures the extent to which the primary segment of the firm is vertically related to all 
secondary segments of the firm. We also compute separate measures for the extent of 
backward and forward vertical relatedness.  
We compute our first set of measures (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff1) for backward 
and forward vertical relatedness based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) as follows. First, we use the 
segment data to identify all four-digit SIC industries in which a firm operates. We also obtain 
the segment sales, assets, and capital expenditures. Then, we find for each dollar of output of 
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industry „i‟ in which the firm operates, the dollar amount of inputs required from all other 
industries „j‟ in which the firm has business segments, where j does not equal „i‟. We denote 
each of these coefficients as 𝜃𝑖𝑗 . The summation of these coefficients, 𝜃𝑖 =
 𝜃𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖   represents per dollar of output of industry „i‟, the dollar amount of inputs from all 
other industries „j‟ in which the firm operates. We then compute the firm level backward 
vertical relatedness coefficient (VrcBackCoeff1) by weighting each 𝜃𝑖  by the sales weight of 
the segment, i.e., 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓1 =  𝜃𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  where wi is the sales of segment „i‟ divided 
by the sales of all segments of the firm. The firm level vertical relatedness coefficient 
(VrcBackCoeff1) measures the opportunity for backward vertical integration between all 
segments of the firm.    
We compute a similar measure based on forward vertical relatedness between 
segments. We find for each dollar of output of industry „i‟ in which the firm operates, the 
dollar amount of output sold to all other industries „j‟ in which the firm has business 
segments, where j does not equal to „i‟. We denote each of these coefficients as 𝛼𝑖𝑗 . The 
summation of these coefficients 𝛼𝑖 =  𝛼𝑖𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1,𝑗≠𝑖   represents per dollar of output of industry 
„i‟, the dollar amount sold to all other industries in which the firm operates. We then compute 
the firm level forward vertical relatedness coefficient (VrcForwCoeff1) by weighting each 𝛼𝑖  
by the sales weight of the segment, i.e. 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓1 =  𝛼𝑖 ∗ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1  where wi is the sales 
of segment „i‟ divided by the sales of all segments of the firm. The firm level vertical 
relatedness coefficient (VrcForwCoeff1) measures the opportunity for forward vertical 
integration between all segments of the firm.        
The second measure of vertical relatedness is based on Fan and Lang (2000). Here, the 
focus is to measure how the primary segment of the firm is vertically related to its secondary 
segments. For each firm-year observation, we identify the primary segment as the segment 
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with the largest sales and denote its corresponding industry as „i‟, and all remaining segments 
as secondary, and their corresponding industries as „j‟ for j=1 to n-1.  
We then find the dollar amount of inputs from the secondary industry „j‟ required to 
produce a dollar of the primary industry „i‟ total output ( ji ). Subsequently, we find the dollar 
flow from the primary industry „i‟ required to produce a dollar of secondary industry „j‟ total 
output ( ij ). We then find 𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇 =
1
2
×  𝛾𝑗𝑖 + 𝛾𝑖𝑗  , which gives measure for the 
opportunity for backward integration between primary industry „i‟ and secondary industry „j‟. 
Finally, the firm-level measure of backward vertical relatedness is computed as the sales 
weighted vertical relatedness between the primary industry „i‟ and all secondary industries „j‟ 
and calculated as 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 =  𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝐼𝑁𝑃𝑈𝑇 ∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑗  where wj is the sales weight of the 
secondary segment „j‟ to the sum of sales of all secondary segments of the firm. 
𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 measures the opportunity for backward vertical integration between the 
primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm.  
We also compute a similar measure to capture the extent of forward integration 
between the primary industry „i‟ and each secondary industry „j‟. Specifically, we find for 
every dollar of output of the primary industry „i‟ the amount transferred to each secondary 
industry „j‟ ( ij ) and for every dollar of output of the secondary industry „j‟ the dollar amount 
transferred to the primary industry „i‟ ( ji ). We then find the extent of output transfers 
between primary industry „i‟ and each secondary industry „j‟ as 𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇 =
1
2
×  𝜂𝑗𝑖 + 𝜂𝑖𝑗  . 
Finally, the firm-level measure of forward vertical relatedness is the sales weighted vertical 
relatedness between the primary industry „i‟ and all secondary industries „j‟ and calculated as 
𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 =  𝑉𝑖𝑗 ,𝑂𝑈𝑇𝑃𝑈𝑇 ∗ 𝑤𝑗𝑗  where wj is the sales weight of the secondary 
segment „j‟ to the sum of all secondary segment sales. 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐹𝑜𝑟𝑤𝐶𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑓2 measures the 
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opportunity for forward vertical integration between the primary segment and all secondary 
segments of the firm.
29
  
The benchmark input-output data uses a different system of industry definitions than 
those from the SIC industry definitions. We, therefore, use the SIC-IO concordance table of 
Fan and Lang (2000) to map the four-digit segment SIC codes to their respective six-digit 
input-output (IO) codes. We employ the Use tables of 1982, 1987, 1992, and 1997 for firm-
year observations during 1984 to 1985, 1986 to 1990, 1991 to 1997, and 1998 to 2005 
respectively. The use of different input-output tables over our sample period is motivated by 
the likelihood that the input-output relations between industries may change over time. 
Furthermore, the 1997 benchmark input-output accounts incorporate the NAICS system 
instead of the SIC system of industry classification. To use the 1997 benchmark input-output 
tables, we first map the four-digit SIC codes of the segments to their respective six-digit 
NAICS codes using the Bridge tables provided by the Bureau of Census. We then find their 
respective IO industries using the NAICS-IO concordance table provided in the 1997 
benchmark input-output accounts. 
2.3. Descriptive Statistics on the Sample of Multi-Segment and Single-Segment Firms 
In Panel A of Table I, we present the summary statistics of the multi-segment and 
single segment firms in our sample. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile 
levels to reduce the effect of outliers on the results. We find that multi-segment firms are 
larger than single segment firms in terms of assets and sales, have a higher profitability than 
single segment firms (EBIT), have a lower R&D intensity than single segment firms, are more 
likely to be listed on a major exchange, are more likely to be incorporated outside the U.S., 
are more likely to be part of the S&P index, are more likely to pay dividends, and belong to 
                                                 
29
 We also compute the vertical relatedness coefficient using segment asset based weights instead of segment 
sales based weights and obtain qualitatively similar results. 
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industries where a larger percentage of firms are diversified and where diversified firms 
account for a larger share of the market share. In unreported results, we find that the 
difference in means between the multi-segment and single-segment samples for all above 
attributes is statistically significant at the 1% level. In summary, we find that the 
characteristics of multi-segment firms are substantially different from those of single segment 
firms. 
In Panel B of Table I, we provide descriptive statistics on our measures of vertical 
relatedness for multi-segment firms. In particular, the opportunity for backward (forward) 
vertical integration between all business segments of multi-segment firms in our sample, 
VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), is on average, 2.81% (2.15%). Further, the opportunity for 
backward (forward) vertical integration between the primary industry of the firm and all 
secondary industries in which the firm operates, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), is on 
average, 1.26% (1.36%). Furthermore, primary segments on average account for 66% of 
multi-segment firm sales (CORESIZE). Secondary segments account for the remaining 34% 
of multi-segment firm sales. This finding indicates that secondary segments represent a 
significant percentage of the total sales (assets) of multi-segment firms.  
The literature has used a vertical relatedness cutoff of either 1% or 5% to capture 
economically significant vertical relations (e.g., Fan and Goyal (2006) and Shenoy (2008)). In 
unreported results, we find that 4,455 (3,544) firm-years have significant backward (forward) 
inter-segment vertical relatedness between all segments based on VrcBackCoeff1 
(VrcForwCoeff1) of 5% or greater. Similarly, we also find that 2,220 (2,295) firm-years have 
significant backward (forward) vertical relatedness between the primary segment and all 
secondary segments based on VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) of 5% or greater. In summary, 
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we find that a significant proportion of multi-segment firms display economically meaningful 
backward and forward vertical relatedness between their business segments. 
3. Determinants of Firm Vertical Boundaries  
In this section, we make predictions regarding the different economic forces that can 
impact the vertical boundaries of firms. We then outline our empirical methodology and 
present and discuss our results based on probit estimations. 
3.1. Variables to Capture Determinants of Vertical Boundaries of the Firm 
The existing literature on vertical integration argues that in presence of contractual 
incompleteness trading partners are reluctant to make relationship-specific investments 
fearing future contractual bargaining problems (e.g., Coase (1937), Klein, Crawford, and 
Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979)). This leads to underinvestment in relationship-
specific investments. Vertical integration, by providing common ownership, mitigates this 
underinvestment problem and provides incentives to make relationship-specific investments. 
Based on the above, we hypothesize that the vertically integrated form should be observed in 
environments likely to involve relationship-specific investments and where contracts are 
likely to be incomplete.  
In contrast to the efficiency argument outlined above, an alternate stream of literature 
suggests that vertical integration is anti-competitive in nature. This literature proposes two 
possible routes through which vertical integration can enhance market power, namely, 
foreclosure, where vertical integration gives the integrated firm an unfair advantage over its 
non-integrated rivals, and collusion, where the vertical integration enhances co-ordination 
with the non-integrated rivals (e.g., Shenoy (2008)). In the determinants section, we also 
investigate these anti-competitive strategies of vertical integration. We propose the following 
variables for the determinants of vertical integration.  
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 (i) R&D intensity of the primary segment‟s four-digit SIC industry measured as R&D 
expenditure divided by net sales (INDRDI). Allen and Phillips (2000) argue that property 
rights are not well defined R&D intensive industries and, therefore, are likely to have 
contracting problems. Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006) find that equity stakes in supplier-
customer relationships are more common in R&D intensive environments. Kale and Shahrur 
(2007) use industry R&D intensity to measure relationship-specific investments. Based on the 
above, we use R&D intensity as the first proxy for incomplete contracts and for the 
prevalence of relationship-specific investments. We predict a positive relation between inter-
segment vertical relatedness and R&D intensity of the primary industry, i.e., a positive sign 
on INDRDI.  
(ii) Strategic alliance/joint venture intensity measured as the number of joint ventures and 
strategic alliances between firms in the primary industry and firms in all secondary industries 
that are vertically related at the 1% level divided by the number of firms in the primary 
industry of the firm (SAJVINT).
30
 This acts as our second proxy for contractual 
incompleteness and prevalence of relationship-specific investments. Kale and Shahrur (2007) 
argue that industries in which strategic alliances and joint ventures with firms in supplier and 
customer industries are prevalent are likely to involve contractual frictions. Fee, Hadlock, and 
Thomas (2006) find that equity stakes by customers in their suppliers are more common if the 
relationship was governed by formal alliance agreements. They argue that equity stakes and 
explicit alliance agreements are complements and can both be used to resolve holdup 
problems. Based on this, we conjecture a positive relation between the degree of vertical 
                                                 
30
 As robustness, we measure SAJVINT based on a 5% cutoff for identifying vertically related industries. We find 
similar results under this approach.  
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relatedness between segments and the strategic alliance and joint venture intensity, i.e., a 
positive sign on SAJVINT.31  
 (iii) Advertising intensity of the primary segment four-digit SIC industry measured as the 
advertising expenditure divided by net sales (INDADV). Prior literature suggests that 
investments in brand name represent relationship-specific investing (e.g., Gatignon and 
Anderson (1988)).  It is likely that advertising spending represents investments towards brand 
capital. Therefore, in industries with high advertising intensity there is likely to be more 
relationship-specific investing as measured by investment in brand name. Accordingly, we 
posit that the higher the industry advertising intensity, the greater is the likelihood to observe 
vertical integration, i.e. a positive sign on INDADV.
32
  
(iv) Selling, general, and administrative expenditure intensity of the primary segment four-
digit SIC industry measured as the selling, general, and administrative expenditure divided by 
net sales (INDSELL). If a firm‟s segments are vertically related it is likely that the firm would 
spend less on transmitting information about its product to prospective buyers/suppliers since 
part of the output produced by some of its segments is potentially being used internally by 
other vertically related segments. If vertical integrating into related industries helps the firm to 
economize on costs of transmitting information, it is likely that vertically integrated firms 
would be observed in industries with less selling, general, and administrative expenditure 
intensity. Consistent with this argument, the extant literature documents a negative 
relationship between vertical relatedness and selling, general, and administrative expenditure 
(e.g., Caves and Bradburd (1988)). Based on the above, we posit a negative relation between 
                                                 
31
 The alliance/joint venture data is obtained from SDC Platinum database. 
32
 In line with our hypothesis, prior research documents a positive relation between firm advertising intensity and 
vertical integration (e.g., Levy (1985), Boerner and Macher (2001), Lafontaine and Shaw (2005), and Nickerson 
and Silverman (2003)). 
- 76 - 
 
vertical relatedness and industry selling, general, and administrative expenditure intensity, 
i.e., a negative sign on INDSELL. 
(v) Sales based Herfindahl index of the primary industry (INDHERF).  This choice is based 
on anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration such as collusion (e.g., Chen (2001) and 
Nocke and White (2007)). In these models, when an industry is already concentrated, a 
vertical takeover with a firm in the supplier/customer industry increases the likelihood of 
collusion between the integrated firm and non-integrated rivals by facilitating a mechanism 
that aids the flow of information between the integrated firm and non-integrated rivals. 
Accordingly, if the motivation behind vertical integration was collusion, we posit a positive 
relation between vertical relatedness and primary industry concentration, i.e., a positive sign 
on INDHERF.  
(vi) Market shares of the firm in its primary and secondary industries (PRIMSEGMKTSH and 
SECSEGMKTSH). The extant literature proposes foreclosure as yet another anti-competitive 
rationale for vertical integration (e.g., Salinger (1988), Ordover, Saloner, and Salop (1990), 
Hart and Tirole (1990) among others). Under this hypothesis, vertical integration provides an 
opportunity for integrated firms to raise the costs of their non-integrated rivals by denying or 
limiting access to inputs or distribution outlets to their rivals. It is likely that the higher the 
market share of the integrated firm in its primary/secondary industries, the greater is its 
market power to foreclose its non-integrated rivals. Accordingly, if the motivation behind 
vertical integration was foreclosure, we expect a positive relation between vertical relatedness 
and the market shares of the firm in its primary/secondary industries, i.e., a positive sign on 
PRIMSEGMKTSH and SECSEGMKTSH.
33
 
                                                 
33
 A multi-segment firm can have multiple secondary segments. We compute the market share of each of a firm‟s 
secondary segment industries, and then value weight these market shares with segment sales weights to arrive at 
SECSEGMKTSH.  
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(vii) Interaction term between proxies for contracting difficulties and industry shocks. Klein 
(1996) and Klein and Murphy (1997) argue that the likelihood of contractual hazards is 
magnified in presence of relationship-specific investments when market conditions change 
sufficiently to place the relationship outside the self-enforcing range of contracts. Consistent 
with this argument, Fan (2000) finds that an increase in price uncertainty in the petrochemical 
industry makes vertical integration more desirable to govern relationship-specific 
transactions. Accordingly, we posit that the interaction between our proxies that capture 
relationship-specific assets and an industry shock variable would also be a determinant of 
vertical integration. As a proxy for the industry shock, we calculate the one-year sales growth 
of the primary industry of the firm (SALGROWTH). We then interact SALGROWTH with 
INDRDI and SAJVINT, our two main variables that capture the likelihood of contracting 
problems, and posit that both the interaction terms would have a positive sign.  
3.2. Estimation Methodology  
We now outline the empirical methodology employed to investigate the determinants 
of vertical relatedness between firm segments. We create dummy variables VrcBackDum1, 
VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2 to measure significant vertical 
relatedness. Specifically, the dummy variable, VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) equals one if 
VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1) is 5% or greater, and is zero otherwise. Similarly, 
VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) equals one if VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) is 5% or 
greater, and is zero otherwise. VrcBackDum1 and VrcForwDum1 capture the extent of 
backward and forward relatedness between all business segments of multi-segment firms. On 
the other hand, VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2 capture the extent of backward and forward 
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relatedness between the primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm.
34
 We then 
estimate probit regressions to investigate how these vertical relatedness dummies are related 
to the determinants of vertical integration as proposed above. 
3.3. Results for the Determinants of Vertical Relatedness across all Segments 
 In Table II, we provide results based on probit estimation for the determinants of 
vertical relatedness between all segments of multi-segment firms. As highlighted earlier, the 
binary dependent variable VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) measures backward (forward) 
vertical relatedness between all segments of a multi-segment firm. In Models 1 and 2, we 
include as explanatory variables industry R&D intensity (INDRDI), strategic alliance and 
joint venture intensity (SAJVINT), industry advertising expenditure intensity (INDADV), 
industry selling, general, and administrative expenditure intensity (INDSELL), industry 
Herfindahl Index (INDHERF), and market shares of the firm in its primary and secondary 
industry (PRIMSEGMKTSH and SECSEGMKTSH). We also include firm size (FIRMSIZE) as 
an additional control variable. All specifications have calendar year dummies and the reported 
p-values are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm. 
As hypothesized, we find a positive relation between the R&D intensity of the firm‟s 
primary industry (INDRDI) and vertical relatedness between all segments (VrcBackDum1 and 
VrcForwDum1) in all our four specifications. This indicates that vertical relatedness between 
business segments is more likely when the firm‟s primary industry is R&D intensive. Further, 
we find that the coefficient on SAJVINT is positive and significant at the 1% level in all four 
specifications. This indicates that inter-segment vertical relatedness is observed in a firm 
when strategic alliances and joint ventures between the primary industry and all vertically 
                                                 
34
 As a robustness check, we use continuous measures of vertical relatedness (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff1, 
VrcBackCoeff2, and VrcForwCoeff2) instead of dummy variables. The results under this approach are 
qualitatively similar to those reported in the paper.  
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related industries are more prevalent. Overall, both these results show that inter-segment 
vertical relatedness is observed in environments likely to have costly contracting.  
We find that INDADV is positively related to the vertical relatedness in all four 
specifications; however, the results are statistically insignificant at conventional levels. The 
positive sign on INDADV is in the hypothesized direction but the results lack statistical power. 
The coefficient on INDSELL is negative and significant at the 1% level in all four 
specifications. A vertically integrated firm, by using part of its outputs internally, is likely to 
spend less on transmitting information about its product to prospective buyers/suppliers. If 
this is true, we should observe vertically integrated firms in industries with less selling, 
general, and administrative expenditure intensity. The negative sign on INDSELL is consistent 
with the above argument.  
The coefficient on INDHERF is insignificant in all specifications, which indicates that 
the vertical integration is unlikely to be motivated by an attempt to promote collusion with 
non-integrated rivals. The coefficient on PRIMSEGMKTSH is found to be negative and 
significant in all four specifications. The negative sign is directly opposite to the prediction 
under the foreclosure hypothesis. Further, inconsistent with the foreclosure hypothesis, the 
coefficient on SECSEGMKTSH is found to be statistically insignificant. Overall, our proxies 
to capture anti-competitive intent of vertical integration behave in a manner inconsistent with 
these hypotheses. The extant literature on mergers and acquisitions and other industry and 
case studies generally find that vertical integration is unlikely to be motivated by anti-
competitive strategies such as foreclosure and collusion (e.g., Eckbo (1983), Hortaçsu and 
Syverson (2007), and Shenoy (2008) among others).  Our evidence complements this 
literature by showing more generally that vertical integration decisions undertaken by 
managers do not seem to be motivated by anti-competitive strategies.  
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 In Models 3 and 4, we include all explanatory variables included in Models 1 and 2 
along with the two interaction terms SAJVINT*SALGROWTH and INDRDI*SALGROWTH. 
We have argued that the potential for holdup is magnified in presence of relationship-specific 
investments when market conditions change sufficiently. We find support for this hypothesis 
in some specifications. In particular, in Model 3, we find that the coefficient on 
INDRDI*SALGROWTH is positive and significant. Further, in Model 4, we find that the 
coefficient on SAJVINT*SALGROWTH is positive and significant. The signs on all other 
explanatory variables are in the same direction as those obtained in Models 1 and 2. The 
results from Models 3 and 4 provide partial support for the view presented by Klein (1996) 
and Klein and Murphy (1997) that in presence of relationship-specific investments, significant 
changes in the market conditions as proxied by the primary industry sales growth increases 
the likelihood of vertical integration. 
3.4. Results for the Determinants of Vertical Relatedness between Primary Segment and all 
Secondary Segments of the Firm 
In Table III, we provide results based on probit estimation for the determinants of firm 
vertical relatedness as measured by the vertical relatedness between the primary segment and 
all secondary segments of the firm. The dependent variable is a binary variable 
VertBackDum2 (VertForwDum2) that equals 1 when the backward (forward) vertical 
relatedness coefficient VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. 
In line with the findings in Table II, we find a positive association between the R&D 
intensity of the firm‟s primary industry (INDRDI) and vertical relatedness between the 
primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm in all four specifications. 
Furthermore, we find a positive relationship between SAJVINT and vertical relatedness 
between the primary segment and all secondary segments of the firm.  
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We find that INDADV is positively related only to VrcForwDum2 in Models 2 and 4. 
If industry advertising expenditures capture the extent of asset specificity, this result supports 
the view that vertical integration is observed in environments likely to involve relationship-
specific investments. The relationship between INDADV and VrcBackDum2 is however found 
to be insignificant. Therefore, overall we obtain mixed results based on INDADV. The 
coefficient on INDSELL is negative and significant at the 1% level in all four specifications, 
which is consistent with our argument that vertical integration helps firms to economize on 
costs of transmitting information.   
Finally, the coefficient on INDHERF is insignificant in all specifications, the 
coefficient on PRIMSEGMKTSH is found to be negative and significant, and the coefficient 
on SECSEGMKTSH is found to be statistically insignificant. In Model 3, we find that the 
coefficient on INDRDI*SALGROWTH and SAJVINT*SALGROWTH are positive and 
significant. However, in Model4, we find that both the interactive terms are positive but 
insignificant. The signs on all other explanatory variables are in the same direction as those 
obtained in Models 1 and 2.  
In summary, we investigate the determinants of vertical relatedness between business 
segments of a firm as measured by (i) Vertical relatedness between all segments of the firm 
and (ii) Vertical relatedness between the primary segment and all secondary segments of the 
firm. Using both measures, we find consistent support for the view that the degree of vertical 
relatedness between business segments of firms is higher in environments likely to be plagued 
by contractual incompleteness and where relationship-specific investments are prevalent. 
Furthermore, inter-segment vertical relatedness does not seem to be motivated by anti-
competitive rationales such as foreclosure or collusion. 
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4. Vertical Relatedness and its Impact on Internal Capital Markets 
In this section, we first discuss the different measures that capture internal capital 
market efficiency as proposed in the extant literature. We then outline our empirical 
methodology to investigate the relation between vertical relatedness and ICM efficiency. 
Subsequently, we perform both univariate analysis and multivariate analyses (based on OLS, 
Heckman, and 2SLS estimations) to investigate how vertical relatedness between business 
segments affects the internal capital market allocations. 
4.1. Measures for Efficiency of Internal Capital Market Allocations  
We use the following measures developed in the extant literature to capture the 
efficiency of internal capital market allocations, Relative Value Added by Allocation (RVA) 
of Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), the Investment-Q sensitivity aggregated over all 
business segments of a firm (IQSENS) developed by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and 
Relative Investment Ratio (RINV) developed by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000). These 
measures capture the association between segment investment and segment investment 
opportunities aggregated across all business segments of multi-segment firms.  
Our first measure Relative Value Added by Allocation (RVA) is computed as follows.  
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In equation (1), wj is the fraction of total firm assets that belong to segment „j‟, Ij is the 
capital expenditure of segment „j‟ obtained from Compustat segment tapes, Aj is the book 
value of segment „j‟ assets, qj is the imputed q for segment „j‟ and measured as the median 
Tobin‟s q for single-segment firms matched on the narrowest SIC industry (four-digit, three-
digit, or two-digit SIC) that includes at least five single-segment firms, q  is the asset-
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weighted imputed q across all segments of the firm, and 
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capital-expenditure to book value of assets for single-segment firms in industry „i‟, matched 
on the narrowest SIC industry (four-digit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC) that includes at least 
five single-segment firms.  
As a proxy for the transfer related to a segment „j‟, Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 
(2000) use the industry-adjusted 
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for that segment. If transfer for a segment „j‟ is positive then the segment is a net receiver, 
and, if negative, the segment is a net provider of funds.  
Since segments are not publicly traded entities the literature has typically used 
imputed q as a proxy for segment investment opportunities. Consistent with this literature, we 
calculate imputed q for a segment as the median Tobin‟s q of single-segment firms in the 
four-digit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC industry of the segment that includes at least five 
single-segment firms. If the internal capital allocations are efficient, segments with high 
investment opportunities (imputed q greater than q ) would be receivers of funds, whereas 
segments with low investment opportunities (imputed q less than q ) would be providers of 
funds. This would lead RVA to be positive. Finally, the magnitude of RVA gives the overall 
value added (subtracted) by the internal allocation policy of diversified firms.   
The second measure IQSENS is a variant of the RVA measure and is computed below 
in equation (2). In Equation (2), wj is the fraction of total firm assets that belong to segment j, 
qj is the imputed q for segment j and calculated as the median Tobin‟s q for single-segment 
firms matched on the narrowest SIC industry (four-digit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC) that 
includes at least five single-segment firms, q is the asset-weighted imputed q across all 
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segments of the firm, Ij is the capital expenditure of segment „j‟, Aj is the book value of 
segment j assets, and 

n
i i
i
i
A
I
w
1
*  is the firm capital expenditure calculated as the asset-
weighted capital expenditure to asset ratio across all segments of the firm.  
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* is a measure of the extent of transfer of capital for a segment. It 
provides the j
th
 segment‟s capital expenditure to asset ratio minus the asset-weighted capital 
expenditure to asset ratio for all segments in the firm. Segments with positive values of this 
variable can be interpreted as net “receivers” of funds, whereas segments with negative values 
represent net “providers” of funds. Similarly, )( qq j  measures the difference between the 
imputed q for the j
th
 segment and the asset-weighted imputed q of all segments in the firm. 
Overall, IQSENS will be positive if high q segments (segments with imputed q above q ) are 
net receivers of funds and low q segments (segments with imputed q below q ) are net 
providers of funds. Therefore, positive values for IQSENS indicate efficient internal capital 
market allocations since investment flows towards segments with better investment 
opportunities.  
The final efficiency measure RINV was developed by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales 
(2000) and is given below in equation (3). Here, for j=1 to k segments, the imputed q is 
greater than the asset-weighted imputed q measured across „n‟ segments of the firm, and for 
j=k-n+1 to n segments that imputed q is less than the asset-weighted imputed q across „n‟ 
segments of the firm. If the firm invests more in segments where imputed q is greater than 
asset-weighted imputed q of firm than in segments where imputed q is less than asset-
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weighted imputed q of firm it would lead to positive values of RINV which indicates efficient 
internal capital market allocations.  
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4.2. Relation between Vertical Relatedness and Internal Capital Market Allocations 
We have argued that the degree of vertical relatedness between business segments of 
firms measures the extent of relatedness in firm projects. Based on Stein (1997), we 
hypothesize that the higher the degree of vertical relatedness, the greater is the efficiency of 
internal capital market allocations. To test this hypothesis, we regress measures that capture 
the efficiency of the internal capital market given in equations (1), (2), and (3) on the degree 
of vertical relatedness and other control variables known to affect internal capital market 
allocations. We propose the following regression models given by equations (4)-(6).
 
𝑅𝑉𝐴𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛼1 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼2 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼3 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼4
∗  𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛼5 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡               4  
   𝐼𝑄𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽 + 𝛽1 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4
∗ 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡                   (5) 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾 + 𝛾1 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾3 ∗ 𝑉𝑟𝑐𝐵𝑎𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑢𝑚1𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐷𝐼𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑆𝐼𝑇𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾4
∗ 𝐻𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑆𝐴𝐿𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾5 ∗ 𝐹𝐼𝑅𝑀𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡              (6) 
The dependent variable is one of the measures of efficiency as outlined in section 4.1. 
VrcBackDum1 is a dummy that equals one when the sales-weighted backward vertical 
relatedness coefficient VrcBackCoeff1 exceeds 5% and zero otherwise. We also estimate 
specifications using VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2 as alternative 
measures for vertical relatedness. The benefit of using indicator variables is that it enables us 
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to compare the investment behavior of vertically integrated firms vs. those that are not.
35
 The 
control variables are based on Rajan et al. (2000) and outlined as follows: DIVERSITY is the 
diversity in investment opportunities, VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY is the interaction between 
vertical relatedness and diversity, FIRMSIZE is firm size measured as the logarithm of the 
firm‟s net sales, and HERFSAL is the sales-based Herfindahl Index of the firm.  
DIVERSITY is calculated as the standard deviation of the firm‟s asset-weighted 
segment imputed q‟s divided by the equally weighted average imputed q (see equation (7)). In 
this equation, qj is the imputed q for segment „j‟ and is calculated as the median Tobin‟s q for 
single-segment firms matched on the four digit, three digit, or two digit SIC codes, wj is the 
asset-weight of segment „j‟, and

wq  is the asset-weighted imputed q across all segments of the 
firm. In Table I, we show that the average value of DIVERSITY is 0.30 which is similar to the 
values in Rajan et al. (2000).  
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Under Stein‟s winner-picking hypothesis, we expect a positive effect of vertical 
relatedness on the ICM efficiency. Accordingly, we would observe a positive sign on α1, β1, 
and γ1. Rajan et al. (2000) argue that diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY) 
increases the managerial rent seeking behavior and distorts investment towards segments with 
relatively lower investment opportunities. Consistent with their argument, we expect a 
                                                 
35
 We perform the following robustness checks. First, we replicate the ICM efficiency regressions using 
continuous vertical relatedness variables (see Footnote 11 for details). Second, instead of using separate 
specifications for backward and forward relatedness we consolidate them into the following dummies; 
HIGHHIGH which is one for firms with high backward and forward relatedness, and HIGHLOW is one for firms 
with high (low) backward and low (high) forward relatedness. We find that HIGHHIGH is positive and 
significant in all specifications. HIGHLOW is positive but is statistically significant in some specifications.       
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negative relation between diversity and internal capital market efficiency measure (α2<0, 
β2<0, and γ2<0).  Further, for a vertically integrated firm, as the diversity in investment 
opportunities increases there is greater rent-seeking behavior by divisional managers which 
negatively impacts the allocating efficiency. Therefore, we expect a negative sign on the 
interaction term between the diversity in investment opportunities and vertical relatedness 
(α3<0, β3<0, and γ3<0). Finally, the extant literature has used segment sales-based Herfindahl 
index as a proxy for firm focus and argued that firm focus improves allocative efficiency of 
internal capital markets (e.g., Rajan et al. (2000)). Further, Stein (1997) predicts that internal 
capital market allocations are efficient when the headquarters oversees a small set of projects. 
Based on the above, we expect a positive relation between HERFSAL, and the efficiency of 
internal capital markets (α4>0, β4>0, and γ4>0). 
4.3. Univariate Results  
 In this section, we present and discuss our univariate results on the internal capital 
market efficiency measures. Specifically, we investigate how internal capital market 
efficiency measures (RVA, IQSENS, and RINV) vary in sub-samples of firms that exhibit 
significant vertical relatedness and those that do not.  
 In Panel A of Table IV, we provide results for our overall sample of 32,552 multi-
segment firm-years. For the overall sample, we find that the average values of RVA and RINV 
are negative, whereas that for IQSENS is positive. However, the average values for all three 
measures for the overall sample are found to be statistically insignificant. This indicates that 
for the overall sample of firms no value is added by internal capital allocations. We then 
segregate our sample of multi-segment firm-years into those that display significant vertical 
relations and those that do not. We expect to observe higher internal capital market efficiency 
in the sub-sample of firms that display significant vertical relatedness.     
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In Panel B, we provide results for sub-samples based on cutoffs of the backward 
vertical relatedness coefficient VrcBackCoeff1 and VrcBackCoeff2. For the sub-sample of 
firms that have VrcBackCoeff1 greater than or equal 5%, we find that the average values of 
RVA, IQSENS, and RINV are 0.00012, 0.00035, and 0.00058, respectively. These are 
statistically significant at conventional levels. On the other hand, in the sub-sample of firms 
with VrcBackCoeff1 less than 5%, the corresponding values are -0.00008, 0.00022, and -
0.00025, respectively and are also found to be statistically significant. The difference in mean 
for the above and below cutoff samples is statistically significant at least at the 10% level. We 
also provide results based on sub-samples based on VrcBackCoeff2 values of above and below 
5%. Here also, we find that the difference in means between the two sub-samples is 
statistically significant at least at the 5% level.  
In Panel C, we provide results for sub-samples based on cutoffs of the forward vertical 
relatedness coefficient, VrcForwCoeff1 and VrcForwCoeff2. In the sub-sample of firms where 
VrcForwCoeff2 is greater than or equal 5%, we find that the average values of RVA, IQSENS, 
and RINV are 0.00027, 0.00048, and 0.00081, respectively. These are statistically significant 
at least at the 10% level. For the sub-sample of firms below the 5% vertical relatedness cutoff, 
the average values are -0.00009, 0.00021, and -0.00025, respectively and are also found to be 
statistically significant. We also observe that the difference in means for the above and below 
cutoff samples is statistically significant at least at the 1% level. Qualitatively similar results 
are found when the sub-samples are based on a forward vertical relatedness coefficient 
VrcForwCoeff2 cutoff of 5%.  
Overall, in this section, we document the following findings. In the sub-sample of 
firms that display significant vertical relations, we find that the average values for RVA, 
IQSENS, and RINV are positive and significant. Furthermore, the difference in means between 
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the sub-samples of firms with high and low vertical relatedness is significant. This 
preliminary evidence shows that (i) vertically related firms systematically allocate investment 
towards segments with better investment opportunities reflecting in positive values of 
efficiency measures, and (ii) vertically related firms exhibit a higher efficiency of internal 
capital allocations than non-vertically related firms.  
4.4. OLS Estimation 
In Table V, we present the results from OLS estimation of Equations (4), (5), and (6) 
to investigate the relation between inter-segment vertical relatedness and internal capital 
market allocations. In Panel A, we report results based on vertical relatedness dummies 
VrcBackDum1 and VrcForwDum1, which measure vertical relations across all segments of 
the firm. In Panel B, we report results with vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum2 and 
VrcForwDum2, which measure vertical relations between the primary segment and all 
secondary segments of the firm. All OLS and subsequent estimations in Sections 4.5 to 4.7 
contain calendar-year dummies and the reported p-values are based on heteroskedasticity 
robust standard errors and clustered by firm. 
In Panel A, we observe that the coefficient on the vertical relatedness measures 
(VrcBackDum1 and VrcForwDum1) is positive and statistically significant at conventional 
levels in all specifications. A similar positive relation is found between vertical relatedness 
measures (VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2) and internal capital market efficiency measures 
in Panel B.  These results are consistent with our expectation that vertical relatedness between 
business segments of the firm improves the allocative efficiency of internal capital markets.  
The interaction term between vertical relatedness and diversity 
(VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY, VrcForwDum1*DIVERSITY, VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY, 
VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY) is negative and significant in most specifications. This indicates 
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that as the diversity in investment opportunities increases, the beneficial effect of vertical 
relatedness on the efficiency of internal capital market allocations is reduced. Further, the 
coefficient on the sales-based Herfindahl Index of the firm (HERFSAL) is positive and 
statistically significant at the 1% level in Panel A and B. The positive sign suggests that as the 
multi-segment firm becomes more focused, it displays higher efficiency in internal capital 
market allocations. Finally, we document a negative but statistically insignificant relation 
between diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY) and the internal capital market 
efficiency measures.  
4.5. Heckman Model Estimation 
In this section, we control for the endogeneity of the firms‟ decision to diversify by 
adopting the Heckman‟s two stage model. In the first stage of the Heckman methodology, 
called the selection equation, we pool the multi-segment and single segment observations and 
estimate a probit regression to model the decision to diversify. We then obtain the Inverse 
Mills Ratio from the first stage and include it in the second stage to correct for the self-
selection bias. This methodology has been used widely in the corporate diversification 
literature. 
Consistent with the diversification literature, we include both firm-level and industry-
level variables to model the propensity to diversify (e.g., Campa and Kedia (2002) and 
Villalonga (2004)). Specifically, we use firm size measured as the logarithm of firm net sales 
(FIRMSIZE), firm profitability measured as the earnings before interest and taxes divided by 
net sales (EBIT), firm investment in capital expenditure measured as the capital expenditures 
divided by net sales (CAPX), firm investment in research and development measured as the 
research and development expenditure divided by net sales (RDI), an indicator variable that 
equals one for firms listed on a major exchange (MAJOREX), an indicator variable that equals 
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one if the firm is incorporated outside the U.S. (FOREIGN), an indicator variable that equals 
one for firms that belong to the S&P index (SPDUMMY), an indicator variable for firms that 
pay dividends (DIVIDUM), the logarithm of the number of years listed on CRSP (LNAGE), 
the fraction of firms in the industry that are diversified (PCTDIV), and the fraction of industry 
sales accounted by diversified firms (PCTSALEDIV), the GDP growth in the prior year 
(GDPG), the number of months of recession in the prior year (CONT), the number of mergers 
and acquisitions in the prior year as provided by SDC Platinum database (NMERG), and the 
deal value of all the mergers and acquisitions as provided by SDC Platinum database 
(DMERG). The estimated selection equation is reported below.  
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 In the selection equation, we find that both firm and industry characteristics play an 
important role in the decision of a firm to diversify into multiple segments. For example, 
firms with larger size (FIRMSIZE), lower profitability (EBIT), lower investment in capital 
expenditure (CAPX), and lower investment in research and development (RDI) are more 
likely to be multi-segment. Firms with higher age (LNAGE), firms that pay dividends 
(DIVIDUM), firms listed on major exchanges (MAJOREX), and firms that are part of the S&P 
index (SPDUMMY) are more likely to be multi-segment. At the industry level, firms in 
industries with larger percentage of diversified firms (PCTDIV), and in industries where 
diversified firms account for larger percentage of sales (PCTSALEDIV) are more likely to be 
multi-segment. Finally, the larger the number of mergers (NMERG), and the larger the GDP 
growth in the prior year (GDPG), the more likely it is for the firms to be diversified. Our 
results for the selection equation are generally consistent with the findings in Campa and 
Kedia (2002) and Villalonga (2004). 
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 The results from the second stage of the Heckman methodology are reported in Table 
VI. In Panel A, we report results based on vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum1 and 
VrcForwDum1 which measure vertical relations across all segments of the firm. In Panel B, 
we report results with vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2 which 
measure vertical relations between the primary segment and secondary segments of the firm.  
 We find that the coefficient on our measures for vertical relatedness (VrcBackDum1, 
VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2) is positive and statistically significant at 
conventional levels in all specifications. The interaction term between vertical relatedness and 
diversity in investment in investment opportunities (VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY, 
VrcForwDum1*DIVERSITY, VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY, VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY) is 
negative and significant in most specifications. Diversity in investment opportunities 
(DIVERSITY) is found to be negatively related to the efficiency of internal capital markets. 
However, the relation is statistically insignificant in most specifications. The coefficient on 
the sales based Herfindahl Index of the firm (HERFSAL) is positive and statistically 
significant at the 1% level in all specifications indicating that focus improves allocative 
efficiency. Finally, the Inverse Mills ratio (INVMILLS) is significant in two of six 
specifications reported in Panel A and in four of six specifications in Panel B. This indicates 
that the self-selection bias is a relevant econometric issue in some of these regressions and 
needs to be controlled for by modeling the propensity to diversify in the first stage. 
In summary, in this section, we find that the firm/industry characteristics can explain 
the decision of firms to diversify. Even after controlling for the selection bias that arises due 
to this situation, we find that an increase in the degree of vertical relatedness between 
segments improves the efficiency of the internal capital market allocations. Diversity in 
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investment opportunities generally reduces this beneficial effect of vertical relatedness on 
internal capital markets. 
4.6. 2SLS Estimation 
In this section, we tackle the potential endogeneity between vertical relatedness and 
efficiency of internal capital market allocations by using 2SLS estimation. The endogeneity 
can arise if, for example, some omitted variable like manager skill leads to higher vertical 
relatedness between segments as well as a higher efficiency in internal capital market 
allocations. To address this endogeneity, we first identify instruments that are related to the 
degree of vertical relatedness between business segments of the firm but that are potentially 
uncorrelated with the efficiency of internal capital market allocations.  
In Section 3.1, we identified industry level variables that are motivated by economic 
theory to explain the extent of vertical relatedness between segments. Since these variables 
are measured at the industry level they are unlikely to impact the firm-level efficiency of 
internal capital market allocations. We also showed that these variables are significant 
determinants vertical relatedness between segments. Based on the above, we use the industry 
level variables INDRDI, SAJVINT, INDADV, INDSELL, and INDHERF as prospective 
instruments for the degree of vertical relatedness. 
The results for the second stage of the 2SLS estimation and all tests pertaining to 
endogeneity and instrumental variable validity are reported in Table VII. All estimation 
models involve an interaction between the endogenous variable, our measure of inter-segment 
vertical relatedness (VrcBackDum1, VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2), and 
diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY). As instruments for the interaction term, 
we use the interaction between our instruments for vertical relatedness and the diversity 
investment opportunities (e.g., Wooldridge (2002)). In the first stage, we include all control 
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variables from the second stage along with instruments including those for the interaction 
term. Due to space constraints, we do not report the first stage estimation results.  
In Panel A, we report results based on vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum1 
and VrcForwDum1 which measure vertical relations across all segments of the firm. In Panel 
B, we report results with vertical relatedness dummies VrcBackDum2 and VrcForwDum2 
which measure vertical relatedness between the primary segment and all secondary segments 
of the firm.  
In all specifications, the C statistic rejects the null hypothesis that the endogenous 
variables are jointly exogenous to the efficiency of internal capital market allocations. This 
adds validity to the usage of 2SLS estimation. Further, the Hansen J is statistically 
insignificant for all specifications. We, therefore, cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
chosen instruments are valid. Finally, the Anderson-Rubin statistic is significant in all 
specifications indicating that the coefficients on the endogenous regressors are jointly 
significant in the second stage.  
In both Panels A and B, we find that our measures for vertical relatedness 
(VrcBackDum1, VrcForwDum1, VrcBackDum2, and VrcForwDum2) are positively related to 
the efficiency of internal capital market allocations at conventional levels of significance in all 
specifications. Diversity in investment opportunities (DIVERSITY) and the interaction term 
between vertical relatedness and diversity in investment opportunities 
(VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY, VrcForwDum1*DIVERSITY, VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY, 
VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY) are found to be statistically insignificant in most specifications. 
Finally, we document a positive relationship between the sales-based Herfindahl Index of the 
firm and the efficiency of internal capital market allocations in all specifications. 
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 Overall, using an instrumental variables approach, we show that vertical relatedness 
between segments of multi-segment firms improves efficiency of internal capital market 
allocations.
36
 
4.7. Single Segment Firms that Choose to Diversify 
As an additional test, we investigate the investment behavior for a sample of single-
segment firms that choose to diversify. In particular, we pay attention to single-segment firms 
that choose to diversify into a vertically related industry. We denote the segment under the 
single-segment structure as “existing” segment. The newly added segment could share 
product market relations with the existing segment (such as vertical or horizontal) or could be 
unrelated to the existing segment. We then compare the sensitivity of investment to 
investment opportunities for the “existing” segment when it operated under the multi-segment 
structure versus that under the single-segment structure.  
We have argued earlier that vertical integration solves the underinvestment problem 
and provides flexibility to undertake investments. If so, the existing segment should be able to 
better respond to investment opportunities under the integrated structure. Accordingly, we 
hypothesize that in the vertically related expansions there will be an increase in the sensitivity 
of investment to investment opportunities. To test this hypothesis, we identify all firms that 
report an increase in the number of segments during 1984 to 2005. We treat the year a firm 
increased the number of segments as t=0, the two years under the multi-segment structure as 
t=+1 and t=+2, and the two years under the single-segment structure as t=-1 and t=-2. We 
create a dummy AFTER which equals 1 for t=+1 and t=+2 and equals 0 for t=-1 and t=-2. We 
                                                 
36
 We perform the following robustness tests. First, we run the OLS, Heckman, and 2SLS estimations of (4), (5), 
and (6) without the interaction term between the vertical relatedness dummy and DIVERSITY. We find that the 
vertical dummy is significantly positive in all 2SLS models and for most of the OLS/Heckman models. Second, 
we use continuous variables of vertical relatedness (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff1, VrcBackCoeff2, and 
VrcForwCoeff2) instead of dummy variables. We find that the positive relation between vertical relatedness and 
ICM efficiency still persists in all the OLS estimations, and for most of the Heckman/2SLS specifications.  
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then pool the „before‟ and „after‟ observations for the segment under the single-segment 
structure.  
The extant literature has used the investment-q sensitivity as a measure for the 
efficiency of ICMs (e.g., Scharfstein (1998) and Gertner, Powers, and Scharfstein (2002)). 
Based on this literature, we propose the regression specification given by Equation (8) to 
compare the investment-q sensitivity under the single-segment vs. vertically integrated 
structures. In the model, CAPX is the ratio of segment capital expenditure to sales of the 
existing segment, MEDTOBQ is the proxy for investment opportunities of the segment and 
measured as the median Tobin‟s q for single-segment firms matched on the narrowest SIC 
industry (four digit, three digit, or two digit SIC) with at least five single-segment firms, 
AFTER is a dummy variable which equals one for observations that belong to t=+1 and t=+2, 
and zero for observations of t=-1 and t=-2, VERT is a dummy variable that equals one if the 
newly added segment shares a vertical relatedness of 5% level or greater with the existing 
segment under single-segment structure, and equals zero if not, HOR is a dummy variable that 
equals one if the four-digit SIC code of the existing segment equals the four-digit SIC code of 
the newly added segment and zero otherwise. Consistent with Gertner, Powers, and 
Scharfstein (2002), we include the segment operating profit scaled by segment sales (OPSS) 
as a control variable in the regression. 
 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑋 = 𝛿 + 𝛿1 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 + 𝛿2 ∗ 𝑂𝑃𝑆𝑆 + 𝛿3 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅 + 𝛿4 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 ∗
𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝑉𝐸𝑅𝑇 + 𝛿5 ∗ 𝑀𝐸𝐷𝑇𝑂𝐵𝑄 ∗ 𝐴𝐹𝑇𝐸𝑅 ∗ 𝐻𝑂𝑅                     (8) 
In the above specification, the coefficient on 3 provides the change in the sensitivity 
of segment investment to investment opportunities from before to after for the addition of an 
unrelated new segment. If expanding into a vertically related industry provides better 
investment incentives in relation to the unrelated expansions, then we expect 4 to be positive.  
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We find 286 cases of single-segment firm-years that diversify into two segments the 
following year during the period 1984 to 2005. We find that in 85 of these expansions the 
newly added segment is vertically related to the existing segment based on vertical relatedness 
coefficient of 5% or more. We provide the results based for the OLS estimation of equation 
(8) in Table VIII. We find that there is a decrease in the sensitivity of investment to 
investment opportunities for the existing segment which does not share product market 
relations with the newly added segment ( 3 is negative). We find that the coefficient on 4 is 
positive and statistically significant. This indicates that in the vertically related expansions, 
the segment investment is more responsive to investment opportunities than in the unrelated 
expansions. Moreover, the sum of 3  
and 4  is positive, indicating that in the vertically 
related expansions there is an increase in the investment-q sensitivity. These findings are 
consistent with our hypothesis. To investigate whether the 1998 change in the segment 
reporting standards (SFAS No. 131) accounts for our findings, we create a dummy PRE1998 
which equals one for observations prior to 1998 and zero otherwise. We then interact this 
variable with AFTER*MEDTOBQ*VERT. In model 2, we find that this interaction term is 
statistically insignificant indicating that the improvement in sensitivity of investment to 
investment opportunities for vertical expansions is not driven by the change in reporting 
standards.
37
  
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we use the benchmark input-output accounts of the U.S. economy and 
measure vertical relatedness between business segments for firms operating in the United 
States. The paper attempts to shed light on two issues, (i) The determinants of vertical 
                                                 
37
 As a robustness test, we use the sum of segment capital and R&D expenditures divided by segment sales as 
our dependent variable. We obtain qualitatively similar results under this approach. 
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relatedness between segments of multi-segment firms on Compustat database, and (ii) How 
inter-segment vertical relatedness affects efficiency of internal capital markets. We measure 
vertical relatedness in a variety of ways. First, we exploit the benchmark input-output data to 
compute backward and forward vertical relatedness for the firm. Second, we use different 
measures to capture (i) the extent of vertical relatedness between all segments of the firm, and 
(ii) the extent to which the secondary segments are vertically related to the primary segment 
of the firm. Our sample comprises of 32,554 multi-segment firm-years covered by Compustat 
database during the period 1984-2005. 
Researchers have argued that vertical integration arises in response to costly 
contracting (e.g., Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978), Williamson (1971, 1979)). We should 
therefore observe a high degree of vertical relatedness between segments in industries likely 
to involve relationship-specific investments and incomplete contracts. Consistent with our 
hypothesis, we find a higher degree of inter-segment vertical relatedness when the R&D 
intensity of the primary industry is higher, and when strategic alliances and joint ventures 
between firms in the primary industry and all vertically related supplier/customer industries 
are more prevalent. We also find that inter-segment vertical relatedness is not motivated by 
the anti-competitive rationales for vertical integration such as foreclosure or collusion. In this 
regard, our evidence is consistent with the mergers literature which finds that vertical mergers 
are efficiency enhancing and are not motivated to enhance market power (e.g., Eckbo (1983) 
and Shenoy (2008)).   
We then investigate how vertical relatedness between business segments affects the 
working of internal capital markets. Although a large body of empirical research addresses 
whether internal capital markets are efficient in allocating funds, very few studies investigate 
how the presence of product market relations between segments affects the working of 
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internal capital markets. In this regard, Stein (1997)‟s „winner-picking‟ hypothesis suggests 
that firms operating in related lines of businesses are able to do a better job in the internal 
allocation of corporate resources across divisions. We test this hypothesis by studying the 
capital allocation made by the universe of all vertically integrated firms and single-segment 
firms that choose to vertically integrate. Consistent with Stein (1997), we find that in firms 
that exhibit significant inter-segment vertical relatedness, the investment flows towards 
segments with better investment opportunities.  
We make the following contributions to the extant literature. First, we provide the first 
examination of determinants of the vertical boundaries for Compustat firms. Our analysis 
builds upon Fee, Hadlock, and Thomas (2006)‟s study on the determinants of partial equity 
stakes and Acemoglu et al. (2009)‟s analysis on the cross-country variation in vertical 
integration. Second, we add to the bright side view of internal capital markets by showing that 
diversifying into vertically related industries facilitates the functioning of internal capital 
markets. Our evidence is consistent with the findings in Khanna and Tice (2001) that related 
diversifiers exhibit efficient internal capital allocations. 
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Table I 
Summary Statistics for the Sample of Multi-segment and Single Segment firms  
This table provides the descriptive statistics of all multi-segment and single segments firms for the sample period 1984-2005. NUMSEG is the number of business 
segments as reported on Compustat, ASSETS is the book value of firm assets in million dollars (Compustat Data6), SALES is the net sales in million dollars 
(Compustat Data12), EBIT is the Earnings before interest and taxes (Compustat Data13 minus Data14) divided by net sales, CAPX is the Capital Expenditures 
(Compustat Data128) divided by net sales,  RDI is the research and development expenditure (Compustat Data 46) divided by net sales, MAJOREX is an indicator 
variable that equals 1 for firms listed on a major exchange, FOREIGN is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the firm is incorporated outside the U.S., SPDUMMY is 
an indicator variable that equals 1 for firms that belong to the S&P index, DIVIDUM is an indicator variable for firms that pay dividends, LNAGE is the logarithm of 
the firm age measured as the number of years listed on CRSP, PCTDIV is the fraction of firms that are diversified in the industry, and PCTSALEDIV is the fraction of 
industry sales accounted by diversified firms. VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1) is the segment sales weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness coefficient 
between all segments of the firm and is based on the methodology developed by Acemoglu et al. (2009). VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) is the segment sales 
weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness between the primary segment of the firm and all its secondary segments and is computed based  on the 
methodology in Fan and Lang (2000). INDRDI is the R&D expenditure (Compustat Data46) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the 
firm. INDADV is the advertising expenditure (Compustat Data45) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDSELL is the 
selling, general, and administrative expenditure (Compustat Data189) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDHERF is the 
sales based Herfindahl Index of the primary industry of the firm. SAJVINT is the number of strategic alliances/joint ventures between firms in the primary industry of 
the firm and all vertically related industries at the 1% level as obtained from the SDC Platinum database divided by the number of firms in the primary industry. 
PRIMSEGMKTSH is the market share of the primary segment in its industry, and SECSEGMKTSH is the segment sales weighted market share of all secondary 
segments in their respective industries. CORESIZE is the proportion of total firm sales accounted by the primary segment of the firm, DIVERSITY is the diversity in 
investment opportunities as measured in Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), and HERFSAL is the Herfindahl Index of the firm based on its segment sales.  
 
Panel A: Characteristics of multi-segment and single-segment firms in sample 
 Multi-Segment Firms  Single-Segment Firms 
 N Mean Median 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile  N Mean Median 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile 
NUMSEG 32,554 2.936 3.000 2.000 3.000  64,045 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
ASSETS ($m.) 32,554 2417.2 447.3 109.0 1971.0  64,019 944.94 140.12 48.90 482.86 
SALES ($ m.) 32,554 2054.3 446.0 115.4 1764.6  64,045 795.62 146.62 53.64 486.79 
EBIT  32,502 0.061 0.071 0.026 0.121  63,808 0.054 0.069 0.018 0.134 
CAPX 32,554 0.081 0.043 0.023 0.085  64,045 0.096 0.043 0.019 0.097 
RDI  32,554 0.022 0.000 0.000 0.022  64,018 0.034 0.000 0.000 0.036 
MAJOREX 32,554 0.767 1.000 1.000 1.000  64,045 0.700 1.000 0.000 1.000 
FOREIGN 32,554 0.131 0.000 0.000 0.000  64,045 0.089 0.000 0.000 0.000 
SPDUMMY 32,554 0.105 0.000 0.000 0.000  64,045 0.047 0.000 0.000 0.000 
PCTDIV 32,554 0.693 0.710 0.579 0.825  64,045 0.444 0.464 0.250 0.636 
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PCTSALEDIV 32,554 0.720 0.767 0.598 0.893  64,045 0.467 0.485 0.181 0.727 
DIVIDUM 32,554 0.489 0.000 0.000 1.000  64,045 0.306 0.000 0.000 1.000 
LNAGE 32,554 2.52 2.64 1.79 3.30  64,045 1.950 1.946 1.099 2.708 
            
Panel B: Vertical relatedness and industry/firm characteristics for multi-segment firms 
       
 N Mean Median 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper 
Quartile       
VrcBackCoeff1 32,552 2.81% 0.23% 0.00% 1.92%       
VrcForwCoeff1 32,552 2.15% 0.14% 0.00% 1.33%       
VrcBackCoeff2 32,397 1.26% 0.11% 0.00% 0.95%       
VrcForwCoeff2 32,397 1.36% 0.07% 0.00% 0.71%       
INDRDI 32,384 0.024 0.002 0.000 0.022       
INDADV 32,384 0.011 0.003 0.000 0.015       
INDSELL 32,384 0.182 0.170 0.091 0.248       
INDHERF 32,384 0.193 0.161 0.090 0.260       
SAJVINT 32,554 0.241 0.058 0.00 0.308       
PRIMSEGMKTSH 32,410 0.066 0.016 0.0033 0.071       
SECSEGMKTSH 32,506 0.0094 0.0011 0.0001 0.007       
CORESIZE 32,554 0.660 0.657 0.520 0.812       
DIVERSITY 32,550 0.302 0.269 0.159 0.425       
HERFSAL 32,554 0.560 0.534 0.412 0.690       
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Table II 
Determinants of Vertical Relatedness between all Business Segments of Multi-Segment 
Firms 
This table provides results for probit regressions of the determinants of vertical relatedness between 
business segments of multi-segment firms. The dependent variable VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) 
is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff1 
(VrcForwCoeff1), based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. The sample period 
is 1984-2005. INDRDI is the R&D expenditure (Compustat Data 46) scaled by net sales (Compustat 
Data 12) for the primary industry of the firm. SAJVINT is the intensity of strategic alliances/joint 
ventures between the primary industry of the firm and all vertically related at the 1% level as 
obtained from the SDC Platinum database. INDADV is the advertising expenditure (Compustat 
Data45) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data 12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDSELL is 
the selling, general, and administrative expenditure (Compustat Data 189) scaled by net sales 
(Compustat Data 12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDHERF is the sales based Herfindahl 
Index of the primary industry of the firm. PRIMSEGMKTSH is the market share of the primary 
segment in its industry, and SECSEGMKTSH is the segment sales weighted market share of all 
secondary segments in their respective industries. FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales. 
SALGROWTH is the one-year sales growth of the primary industry of the firm. All variables are 
winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. All specifications contain calendar year dummies. p-
values reported in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are 
clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
     
 VrcBackDum1 VrcForwDum1 VrcBackDum1 VrcForwDum1 
     
 
INDRDI     2.813***    1.7697**      2.4839***     1.6105** 
 (<0.01) (0.02) (<0.01) (0.03) 
SAJVINT     0.234***     0.2416***    0.2340***      0.2381*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
INDADV 2.3963 1.5015 2.366 1.4413 
 (0.11) (0.33) (0.11) (0.35) 
INDSELL    -2.0855***    -1.7057*** -2.0669***   -1.6877*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
INDHERF 0.1482 0.0709 0.1471 0.0553 
 (0.29) (0.66) (0.30) (0.73) 
PRIMSEGMKTSH    -1.2483***    -0.9323***  -1.2532***  -0.9391*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
SECSEGMKTSH -0.0279 0.7983 -0.0597 0.7741 
 (0.98) (0.28) (0.95) (0.30) 
SAJVINT*SALGROWTH   0.0079 0.0227** 
   (0.31) (0.03) 
INDRDI*SALGROWTH     1.6444*** 0.7399 
   (<0.01) (0.28) 
FIRMSIZE      0.1836***   0.1560***   0.1841*** 0.1561*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Constant     -1.7504*** -2.0813*** -1.7441*** -2.0708*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,333 32,333 32,326 32,326 
Chi-Squared 401.3 339.6 411.6 351.4 
P Value <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 
Pseudo RSquared 0.084 0.0719 0.0845 0.0724 
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Table III 
Determinants of Vertical Relatedness between the Primary Segment and all Secondary 
Segments of Multi-Segment Firms 
This table provides results for probit regressions of the determinants of vertical relatedness between 
the primary segment and all secondary segments of multi-segment firms. The dependent variable 
VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) 
vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), based on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5% 
and 0 otherwise. The sample period is 1984-2005. INDRDI is the R&D expenditure (Compustat 
Data46) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. SAJVINT is the 
intensity of strategic alliances/joint ventures between the primary industry of the firm and all 
vertically related at the 1% level as obtained from the SDC Platinum database. INDADV is the 
advertising expenditure (Compustat Data45) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary 
industry of the firm. INDSELL is the selling, general, and administrative expenditure (Compustat 
Data189) scaled by net sales (Compustat Data12) for the primary industry of the firm. INDHERF is 
the sales based Herfindahl Index of the primary industry of the firm. PRIMSEGMKTSH is the market 
share of the primary segment in its industry, and SECSEGMKTSH is the segment sales weighted 
market share of all secondary segments in their respective industries. FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of 
firm net sales. SALGROWTH is the one-year sales growth of the primary industry of the firm. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. All specifications contain calendar year 
dummies. p-values reported in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors 
and are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 
respectively. 
     
 VrcBackDum2 VrcForwDum2 VrcBackDum2 VrcForwDum2 
     
 
INDRDI  1.6982*    1.5506*     1.633**     1.7522** 
 (0.06) (0.08) (0.03) (0.02) 
SAJVINT        0.2625***        0.213***        0.2608***       0.2098*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
INDADV 0.7953 3.258* 1.3205    3.778** 
 (0.67) (0.07) (0.73) (0.03) 
INDSELL      -2.031***       -2.4664***      -2.1832***      -2.6351*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
INDHERF -0.078 -0.1703 -0.0846 -0.1806 
 (0.68) (0.35) (0.45) (0.31) 
PRIMSEGMKTSH      -2.609***      -2.437***     -2.5799***      -2.4043*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
SECSEGMKTSH -1.7605 -0.7577 -1.7558 -0.7429 
 (0.15) (0.51) (0.15) (0.52) 
SAJVINT*SALGROWTH   0.0189* 0.0174 
   (0.07) (0.11) 
INDRDI*SALGROWTH       2.3018*** 1.148 
   (<0.01) (0.13) 
FIRMSIZE      0.188***      0.1575***     0.1872***        0.1562*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Constant      -1.9924***    -2.0112***     -1.9634***    -1.983*** 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,178 32,178 32,171 32,171 
Chi-Squared 307.1 279 341 295 
Pseudo RSquared 0.104 0.094 0.105 0.0947 
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Table IV 
Univariate Results for the Measures of Internal Capital Market Efficiency by Vertical 
Relatedness 
This table provides gives the univariate results on the internal capital market efficiency measures. The sample period 
is 1984-2005 and the sample includes all multi-segment firms on Compustat. RVA is the Relative Value Added by 
Allocation developed by Rajan, Servaes, and Zingales (2000), IQSENS is the Investment to Q sensitivity developed 
by Peyer and Shivdasani (2001), and RINV is the Relative Investment Ratio developed by Rajan, Servaes, and 
Zingales (2000). VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1) is the sales weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness 
between all segments of the firm and is based on the methodology proposed in Acemoglu et al. (2009). 
VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2) is the sales weighted backward (forward) vertical relatedness between the primary 
segment and all secondary segments of the firm and is based on the methodology proposed in Fan and Lang (2000). 
All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. Panel A provides the univariate results of efficiency 
measures for the overall sample of multi-segment firms. Panel B provides the sub-sample analysis based on the 
backward vertical coefficients (VrcBackCoeff1, VrcBackCoeff2) and Panel C provides sub-sample analysis based 
on the forward vertical coefficient (VrcForwCoeff1, VrcForwCoeff2). In each panel, cutoffs of 5% and 1% are used 
for VRCATINP and VRCATOUT. Efficiency measures are reported for the firms above the cutoff and below the 
cutoff. DiffMean is the t-statistic for the difference in means between the below and above cutoff samples. ***, **, 
and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels respectively. 
 
Efficiency Measures N Mean 
Lower 
Quartile 
Upper  
Quartile  
RVA 32,552 -0.00005 -0.00089 0.00057  
IQSENS 32,552   0.00024 -0.00029 0.00048  
RINV 32,472 -0.00013 -0.0065 0.00485  
Panel B-Backward Vertical Relatedness 
 VrcBackCoeff1<0.05 VrcBackCoeff1>=0.05  
 N Mean N Mean DiffMean 
RVA 28,097 -0.00008** 4,455       0.00012* -2.20** 
IQSENS 28,097   0.00022*** 4,455    0.00035*** -1.83** 
RINV 28,023    -0.00025* 4,449       0.00058* -2.16** 
      
 VrcBackCoeff2<0.05 VrcBackCoeff2>=0.05   
 N Mean N Mean DiffMean 
RVA 30,180   -0.00008** 2,220       0.00034***    -3.33*** 
IQSENS 30,180   0.00022*** 2,220       0.00048***  -2.47** 
RINV 30,104  -0.00022* 2,216  0.001* -2.36** 
Panel C-Forward Vertical Relatedness 
 VrcForwCoeff1<0.05 VrcForwCoeff1>=0.05   
 N Mean N Mean DiffMean 
RVA 29,008  -0.00009*** 3,544      0.00027** -3.54*** 
IQSENS 29,008   0.00021*** 3,544      0.00048*** -3.21*** 
RINV 28,934  -0.00025* 3,538      0.00081* -2.51** 
      
 VrcForwCoeff2<0.05 VrcForwCoeff2>=0.05   
 N Mean N Mean DiffMean 
RVA 30,105   -0.0001*** 2,295   0.00051** -4.92*** 
IQSENS 30,105    0.00021*** 2,295    0.00056***         -3.37*** 
RINV 30,028 -0.00029** 2,292       0.0018***         -4.06*** 
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Table V 
OLS Regressions of Internal Capital Market Efficiency Measures on Vertical Relatedness  
The sample includes all multi-segments on Compustat from 1984-2005. The dependent variable is the measure 
for internal capital market efficiency (RVA, IQSENS, or RINV). FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales. 
DIVERSITY is the diversity in investment opportunities is measured as the standard deviation of the asset 
weighted segment q‟s. HERFSAL is the sales based Herfindahl index across the business segments of the firm. 
VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical 
relatedness, VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. 
VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical 
relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), based on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. All 
variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. Panel A (Panel B) provides regressions based on asset 
(sales) weighted vertical relatedness coefficients. All specifications contain calendar year dummies. p-values 
reported in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm. The 
symbols ***, **, and * denote p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
 
 
RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM Panel A 
VrcBackDum1 
 
  0.0006** 0.0004* 
      
0.0027*** 
   (0.02) (0.07) (0.01) 
VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY 
 
-0.0013** -0.0008 -0.0062** 
   (0.03) (0.14) (0.02) 
VrcForwDum1 
    
 0.0008***  0.0005**    0.0022* 
(<0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
VrcForwDum1*DIVERSITY 
    
-0.0016** -0.0008 -0.0038 
(0.04) (0.21) (0.28) 
FIRMSIZE 
 
0.000 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
(0.12) (0.77) (0.57) (0.15) (0.86) (0.52) 
DIVERSITY 
 
-0.0006 -0.0006* -0.0014 -0.0006 -0.0006* -0.0017 
(0.14) (0.08) (0.34) (0.13) (0.07) (0.26) 
HERFSAL 
 
0.0015*** 0.0009*** 0.0047*** 0.0015*** 0.0009*** 0.0046*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Constant 
 
-0.0016*** -0.0003 -0.0039*** -0.0016*** -0.0003 -0.0038*** 
(<0.01) (0.57) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.59) (<0.01) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,548 32,548 32,468 32,548 32,548 32,468 
RSquared 0.00367 0.00193 0.00223 0.00396 0.00218 0.00212 
F Val 3.52 1.785 1.906 3.626 1.97 1.866 
       
Panel B RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM 
VrcBackDum2 
 
  0.0010*** 0.0006** 0.0041** 
   (<0.01) (0.03) (0.01) 
VrcBackDum2* DIVERSITY 
 
-0.0022*** -0.0012* -0.0097** 
   (<0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
VrcForwDum2 
    
0.0012*** 0.0007** 0.0049*** 
(<0.01) (0.02) (<0.01) 
VrcForwDum2* DIVERSITY 
    
-0.0024*** -0.0013* -0.0101** 
(<0.01) (0.07) (0.02) 
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FIRMSIZE 
 
0.0000* 0.000 0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.0001 
(0.08) (0.64) (0.40) (0.11) (0.71) (0.49) 
DIVERSITY 
 
-0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0012 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0011 
(0.19) (0.11) (0.41) (0.22) (0.12) (0.45) 
HERFSAL 
 
0.0014*** 0.0008** 0.0043*** 0.0013*** 0.0008** 0.0041*** 
(<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 
 
-0.0016*** -0.0003 -0.0039*** -0.0016*** -0.0003 -0.0037*** 
(<0.01) -0.57 (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.60) (<0.01) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,396 32,396 32,316 32,396 32,396 32,316 
RSquared 0.0039 0.00196 0.00226 0.00425 0.00213 0.00255 
F Val 3.665 1.821 1.888 3.707 1.941 1.969 
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 Table VI 
Heckman Regressions of Internal Capital Market Efficiency Measures on Vertical Relatedness 
The sample includes all multi-segments on Compustat from 1984-2005. The dependent variable is the measure for 
internal capital market efficiency (RVA, IQSENS, or RINV). FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales. 
DIVERSITY is the diversity in investment opportunities is measured as the standard deviation of the asset weighted 
segment q‟s. HERFSAL is the sales based Herfindahl index across the business segments of the firm. 
VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, 
VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), based on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. VrcBackDum2 
(VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2 
(VrcForwCoeff2), based on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. INVMILLS is the Inverse Mills 
Ratio from the selection equation. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile level. Panel A (Panel B) 
provides regressions based on asset (sales) weighted vertical relatedness coefficients. All specifications contain 
calendar year dummies and reported p-values in the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard 
errors and are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote  p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
 
 
Panel A RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM 
VrcBackDum1 
 
0.0006** 0.0004* 0.0028***    
(0.02) (0.07) (0.01)    
VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY 
 
-0.0013** -0.0008 -0.0065**    
(0.03) (0.14) (0.01)    
VrcForwDum1 
 
   0.0008*** 0.0005** 0.0023* 
   (0.01) (0.02) (0.06) 
VrcForwDum1* DIVERSITY 
 
   -0.0016** -0.0008 -0.0041 
   (0.04) (0.22) (0.24) 
FIRMSIZE 0.0001** 0.000 0.0001 0.0001** 0.000 0.0001 
(0.02) (0.85) (0.28) (0.03) (0.97) (0.26) 
DIVERSITY -0.0006 -0.0006* -0.0016 -0.0006 -0.0006* -0.0018 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.29) (0.1) (0.07) (0.22) 
HERFSAL 0.0014*** 0.0009*** 0.0046*** 0.0014*** 0.0009*** 0.0045*** 
(<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Constant 
 
-0.0012*** 0.0001 -0.0030** -0.0011*** 0.0002 -0.0029** 
(<0.01) (0.57) (0.02) (<0.01) (0.53) (0.03) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Total Observations 96,033 96,033 96,033 96,033 96,033 96,033 
Censored Observations 63,627 63,627 63,707 63,627 63,627 63,707 
INVMILLS    0.0002** -0.00001 0.0006   0.0002** 0.00003 0.0006 
Chi-Square 95.31 48.32 50.46 97.42 53.62 48.76 
R-squared . . . . . . 
 
Panel B RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM 
VrcBackDum2 
 
0.0010*** 0.0006** 0.0041**    
(<0.01) (0.03) (0.01)    
VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY 
 
-0.0023*** -0.0012* -0.0101**    
(<0.01) (0.06) (0.01)    
VrcForwDum2 
 
     0.0012*** 0.0007** 0.0050*** 
   (<0.01) (0.02) (<0.01) 
VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY 
 
   -0.0024*** -0.0013* -0.0106** 
   (0.01) (0.07) (0.02) 
FIRMSIZE 0.0001** 0.000 0.0002 0.0001** 0.000 0.0001 
 (0.01) (0.7) (0.16) (0.02) (0.77) (0.22) 
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DIVERSITY -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0014 -0.0005 -0.0005 -0.0013 
 (0.15) (0.11) (0.34) (0.18) (0.12) (0.38) 
HERFSAL 0.0013*** 0.0008*** 0.0042*** 0.0013*** 0.0008** 0.0041*** 
 (<0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Constant 
 
-0.0012*** 0.0002 -0.0030** -0.0011*** 0.0002 -0.0029** 
(<0.01) (0.56) (0.02) (<0.01) (0.52) (0.03) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 95,879 95,879 95,879 95,879 95,879 95,879 
Censored Observations 63,627 63,627 63,707 63,627 63,627 63,707 
INVMILLS    0.0003** -0.000001 0.00069*   0.0003** -0.000001 0.00066* 
Chisqr 99.48 49.2 50.23 100.3 52.62 51.94 
R-Squared - - - - - - 
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Table VII 
2SLS Regressions of Internal Capital Market Efficiency Measures on Vertical Relatedness 
 
The table reports the results for the second stage of the 2SLS estimation. The sample period is 1984-2005. 
The dependent variable is the measure for internal capital market efficiency (RVA, IQSENS, or RINV). 
FIRMSIZE is the logarithm of firm net sales. DIVERSITY is the diversity in investment opportunities is 
measured as the standard deviation of the asset weighted segment q‟s. HERFSAL is the sales based 
Herfindahl index across the business segments of the firm. VrcBackDum1 (VrcForwDum1) is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff1 (VrcForwCoeff1), based 
on Acemoglu et al. (2009) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. VrcBackDum2 (VrcForwDum2) is a dummy that 
equals 1 if the firm-level backward (forward) vertical relatedness, VrcBackCoeff2 (VrcForwCoeff2), based 
on Fan and Lang (2000) exceeds 5% and 0 otherwise. All variables are winsorized at the 1 and 99 percentile 
level. Panel A (Panel B) provides regressions based on asset (sales) weighted vertical relatedness 
coefficients. The Hansen J statistic tests the overidentifying restrictions with the joint null hypothesis that all 
instruments are valid. The Anderson Rubin statistic tests the joint significance of the endogenous regressors 
in the second stage with the null hypothesis that all coefficients are zero. The C statistic tests the exogeneity 
of endogenous regressors under the null that the endogeneous regressors can be treated as exogenous. All 
specifications contain calendar year dummies and p-values reported in the parentheses are based on 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm. The symbols ***, **, and * denote 
p<0.01, p<0.05, and p<0.1 respectively. 
 
 
 
VARIABLES RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM 
       
VrcBackDum1     0.002*** 0.0009* 0.0061**    
 (<0.01) (0.09) (0.03)    
VrcBackDum1*DIVERSITY -0.0025 -0.0003 -0.0051    
 (0.16) (0.82) (0.49)    
VrcForwDum1       0.0021*** 0.0010* 0.0064** 
    (0.01) (0.09) (0.05) 
VrcForwDum1* DIVERSITY    -0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0037 
    (0.24) (0.79) (0.67) 
FIRMSIZE 0.000 0.000 -0.0001 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.85) (0.61) (0.65) (0.69) (0.75) (0.81) 
DIVERSITY -0.0005 -0.0006* -0.0018 -0.0005 -0.0006* -0.0019 
 (0.21) (0.07) (0.26) (0.19) (0.08) (0.24) 
HERFSAL    0.0016*** 0.0010*** 0.0054*** 0.0016*** 0.0010*** 0.0054*** 
    (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) 
Constant -0.0010*** 0.0001 -0.0028** -0.0010*** 0.0001 -0.0025** 
 (<0.01) (0.73) (0.03) (<0.01) (0.64) (0.04) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,379 32,185 32,105 32,379 32,170 32,105 
Hansen J 3.59 10.37 4.03 3.25 12.70 3.65 
Hansen J  (P value) (0.17) (0.11) (0.26) (0.20) (0.12) (0.30) 
Anderson Rubin      16.67***   19.2**     15.82***    16.67***   22.5**    15.82*** 
Anderson Rubin (P Value) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) 
C Stat      10.04***   7.72**   10.05***   8.61** 5.40*   8.80** 
C Stat (P Value) (<0.01) (0.02) (<0.01) (0.01) (0.07) (0.01) 
R-squared - - - - - - 
 
VARIABLES RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM RVA IQSENS RINVFIRM 
VrcBackDum2 0.0029*** 0.0011* 0.0082**    
 (<0.01) (0.09) (0.03)    
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VrcBackDum2*DIVERSITY -0.0043* -0.0005 -0.0077    
 (0.06) (0.82) (0.41)    
VrcForwDum2 
   
   0.0028*** 
(<0.01) 
  0.0011* 
(0.10) 
0.0079** 
(0.03) 
VrcForwDum2*DIVERSITY    -0.0041 -0.0003 -0.007 
    (0.07) (0.88) (0.46) 
FIRMSIZE 0.00002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.46) (0.82) (0.95) (0.77) (0.83) (0.99) 
DIVERSITY -0.0004 -0.0006* -0.0013 -0.0003 -0.0006 -0.0011 
 (0.39) (0.09) (0.39) (0.46) (0.11) (0.47) 
HERFSAL 
   
0.0012*** 0.0008** 0.0039** 0.0012*** 0.0007** 0.0037** 
 (<0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (<0.01) (0.03) (0.02) 
Constant -0.0009*** 0.0002 -0.0021* -0.0008*** 0.0002 -0.0018 
 (<0.01) (0.43) (0.09) (0.01) (0.34) (0.14) 
Calendar year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 32,225 32,225 32,145 32,225 32,225 32,145 
Hansen J 3.96 13.55 3.86 4.11 11.05 4.07 
Hansen J P Val (0.14) (0.11) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13) 
Anderson Rubin 18.26***   20.83**    15.19***     18.26***   20.83**    15.19*** 
Anderson Rubin P (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) (<0.01) (0.01) (<0.01) 
C Stat    9.81***    7.02**    10.00***  7.21** 5.96*   6.98** 
C Stat P Val (<0.01) (0.03) (<0.01) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) 
R-squared - - - - - - 
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Table VIII 
Sensitivity of Segment Investment to Investment Opportunities for Single-Segment 
Firms that Choose to Diversify 
This table contains the results for OLS regression models for the segment investment sensitivity to 
Tobin‟s q for single-segment firms that started during the sample period of 1984 to 2005 as single-
segment firms but chose to diversify. The observations included are for the segment that appeared 
in the single-segment regime as well as the multi-segment regime. Observations for t=-2 (two years 
prior to the calendar year the firm became multi-segment), t=-1 (one year prior to the calendar year 
the firm became multi-segment), t=+1 (one year after the calendar year the firm became multi-
segment), and t=+2 (two years after the calendar year the firm became multi-segment) have been 
included in the analysis. The dependent variable CAPX which is the segment capital expenditure 
divided by sales MEDTOBQ is the median Tobin‟s q of single segment firms matched on the four-
digit, three-digit, or two-digit SIC codes. OPSS is the segment operating income divided by 
segment sales. AFTER is a dummy that is set to one for observations at t=+1 and t=+2 and zero 
otherwise. VERT is a dummy that is set to one if the vertical relatedness coefficient between the 
segment under the single-segment status and newly added segment is greater than or equal to 5% 
and set to zero otherwise. HOR  is a dummy that is set to one if the four digit SIC code of the old 
segment equals that of the new segment and set to zero otherwise. PRE1998 is a dummy that equals 
one for observations prior to 1998 and zero for observations in 1998 or later. p-values reported in 
the parentheses are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and are clustered by firm.  
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. 
 
Dependent Variable: CAPX Model 1 Model 2 
 
   
 
MEDTOBQ 0.0111 0.0134 
 
 (0.45) (0.37) 
 
OPSS     0.344***      0.349*** 
 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) 
 
AFTER*MEDTOBQ -0.0169***      -0.0164*** 
 
 (<0.01) (<0.01) 
 
AFTER*MEDTOBQ*VERT   0.0304** 0.049* 
 
 (0.04) (0.09) 
 
AFTER*MEDTOBQ*HOR 0.0162 0.0125 
 
 (0.34) (0.49) 
 
AFTER*MEDTOBQ*VERT*PRE1998  -0.035 
 
  (0.25) 
 
Constant   0.042**    0.038** 
 
 (0.03) (0.05) 
 
Observations 1,050 1,050 
 
F Val     6.13***    5.37*** 
 
R-squared 0.11 0.11 
 
 
 
